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ABSTRACT

This research investigates the political economy of Nicaragua’s development
since Daniel Ortega’s return to power in 2007, with specific emphasis on Venezuela and
China’s influence, energy policy, and environmental and social justice related to the
Nicaragua canal. The first section examines the Ortega administration’s selective
interpretation of the concept of imperialism and its effect on the environment as it
pertains to US interests, Venezuelan oil financing and socialist rhetoric, and China’s
control over a large piece of Nicaraguan territory to build an interoceanic canal. The next
section uses political ecology to address how Nicaragua has balanced its aggressive
renewable energy initiative in light of Venezuela’s large-scale funding of the Ortega
regime from its oil revenues in exchange for an ideological alliance through ALBA and
access to the Pacific coast for oil exports to China. Part three of this research focuses on
China’s involvement in the Nicaragua canal. Nicaragua’s Ortega administration granted a
massive concession to Chinese company HKND to build the elusive “grand canal” across
Nicaragua, though various national interests have pursued the interoceanic canal for
centuries. The fourth and final section focuses on the social, environmental, and political
issues surrounding the legal concession granted to the Chinese company HKND to build
the interoceanic canal.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

In the age of rapid globalization, shifting global economic powers are fast moving
targets which demand critical attention as the United States’ role in the global economic
order is redefined in the 21st century. This dissertation examines broad questions of
shifting regional alliances, sustainability of economic models that deviate from neoliberal
capitalism, megaprojects, China’s role in economic development through infrastructure,
and the resistance to the human and environmental rights violations often found in this
type of development. This study uses Nicaragua as a lens through which to examine
ideological rhetoric compared to political and economic reality in the case of Venezuela’s
financial and ideological support and China’s concession for an interoceanic canal.
Broadly, this study is an examination of space and place in Nicaragua, and who controls
land and resources, and why. The ideas of “Nicaragua” and “revolution” remain closely
and inextricably associated almost 40 years after the Nicaraguan revolution. After
revolutionary leader Daniel Ortega’s return to power in 2007, his policies have become
crystalized into what is commonly labeled as Sandinismo 2.0, or Danielismo, as these
vary notably from the policies of the original Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN). Ortega’s return is often characterized as a piece of the larger regional resurgence
of the “New Left” in Latin America. This dissertation attempts to unpack the nuances and
significance of Nicaragua’s political and economic development.
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Overview

This research has centered on the political ecology and economy of Nicaragua’s
post-revolutionary development, with specific emphasis on new forms of imperialism
from Venezuela and China, the ways in which Daniel Ortega’s rhetoric and policy has
morphed from the original FSLN revolutionary ideology, and how the anti-canal protest
movement has re-captured the original tenets of the Nicaraguan revolution. This
dissertation consists of seven chapters, four of which serve as stand-alone articles. Three
of these articles have been sent to academic journals or books for review. The first
chapter provides an overview of the dissertation, an outline of the research questions, a
description of the intellectual merit, and an explanation of the research methods. The
second chapter provides important theoretical framework, background, and literature
review. It also includes a comprehensive overview of the history of Sandinismo as
important context to the following chapters.

The third chapter focuses on the political economy of the current Ortega
administration in Nicaragua, as part of the return of left-leaning leadership in Latin
America since the early 2000s. This research investigates the Ortega administration’s
selective interpretation of the concept of imperialism as it pertains to US interests,
Venezuelan oil financing and socialist rhetoric, and China’s control over a large piece of
Nicaraguan territory to build an interoceanic canal. It examine the ways in which the
Ortega administration’s platform is highly critical of the United States and its political
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and economic involvement in Nicaraguan affairs, but still maintains a beneficial political
and economic relationship with the US while at the same time entertaining financial and
ideological alliances with Venezuela, via its oil financing and ALBA alliance; and China,
through the massive canal concession granted to Chinese interests. It argues that
Venezuelan and Chinese interests in Nicaragua are equally imperialist in their rhetoric
and actions, yet compliment the Ortega administrations current rhetorical and real
priorities in a more overt way than US interests. This chapter is titled “Imperialism Three
Ways: The Political Economy of Sandinismo 2.0,” and was sent for review for a special
issue of the Cahiers des Ameriques Latines.

Chapter four of this dissertation uses political ecology to address how Nicaragua
has balanced its aggressive renewable energy initiative in light of Venezuela’s large-scale
funding of the Ortega regime from its oil revenues in exchange for an ideological alliance
through ALBA and access to the Pacific coast for oil exports to China. Venezuela made
significant contributions of fuel oil and new thermal power plants with names such as
Che Guevara and Hugo Chavez, thus maintaining Nicaragua’s historically high reliance
on imported fuel oil for its electricity needs and reinforcing its socialist ideology. At the
same time, Nicaragua has been promoting a robust renewable energy initiative, citing
lofty goals of becoming 90% renewable by 2020, and enacting regulatory framework to
promote renewable energy investment. This helps Nicaragua secure climate change
mitigation funding from international organizations. On the surface, the neoliberal and
socialist rhetoric and policy surrounding Nicaragua’s energy development priorities seem
to be competing, but further analysis reveals that the Ortega administration has achieved
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its near-term goal of increased energy generation and electrification; albeit through
traditional thermal generation enabled by Venezuela. That it kept the discourse and
international attention directed at its renewable energy initiative and attracting relevant
capital for climate goals, instead of its fossil fuel-based energy infrastructure financed by
Venezuela, marks the skill and foresight of the Ortega administration in balancing both
neoliberal and socialist development paradigms. The reality remains that Nicaragua is
still heavily dependent on imported fuel oil for its energy needs, illustrating the Ortega
administration’s emphasis on rhetoric over reality.

Chapter five of this dissertation focuses on China’s involvement in the Nicaragua
canal. Nicaragua’s Ortega administration granted a massive concession to Chinese
company HKND to build the elusive “grand canal” across Nicaragua, though various
national interests have pursued the interoceanic canal for centuries. The Nicaraguan
government currently promotes the canal with a discourse of national development and
progress for the people, congruent with China’s rhetoric for promoting the canal. The
Sandinistas of today are now fostering a system of government that promotes many of the
tenets they ostensibly fought against, such as poverty, social injustice, environmental
degradation, and US imperialism. This is highlighted by Nicaragua’s partnership with
China on the canal project, as China is not afraid to embrace and exacerbate social and
environmental injustice at home or in Nicaragua through “megaproject imperialism.” As
such, there has been a significant amount of protest and criticism surrounding the
political, social, and environmental impacts of the canal. China’s need for resources from
South America such as timber, food commodities like soy, and fossil fuels provide the
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impetus for a $50 billion canal bifurcating Nicaragua; and has negative environmental
implications far beyond the canal zone. Though the concessions were signed in 2013, few
obvious signs of progress towards construction of the canal exist. However, fieldwork
over the past 4 years reveals subtle actions taken by the Chinese and the Nicaraguan
government to begin construction of the Canal and associated projects like free trade
zones. This section of the dissertation explores the discourses and actions surrounding
the plan to build a canal across Nicaragua, with particular interest in the imperialist
motivations of the United States to build a Nicaragua canal at the turn of the 20th
century, and the similarities to the ways the Ortega administration and HKND’s Wang
Jing frame the current project, in contrast to the various environmental and political
criticisms it has received. This research examines the rhetoric versus reality of progress
towards the Chinese canal project in Nicaragua through analysis of government
documents, news reports, in-depth interviews, and exploration of the lands along the
proposed route of the canal on the Pacific side of Nicaragua. This research is compiled in
an article titled “Nicaragua's "Grand" Canal: Cuento Chino? Rhetoric and field-based
evidence on the Chinese Presence in Nicaragua” currently under review to be published
in a special issue of the Journal of Latin American Geography on New Geographies of
China Latin America Relations (Volume 17, Issue 2; 2018).

The sixth chapter of this dissertation focuses on the social, environmental, and
political issues surrounding the legal concession granted to the Chinese company HKND
to build the interoceanic canal. This analysis takes a critical, feminist approach to
understanding the dynamics of the “No al Canal” movement, in light of the social and
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environmental justice issues stemming from the canal concession law (Law 840). Here, it
is found that two key players in the anti-canal movement utilize their individual identities
to access and mobilize key components of a vocal resistance movement. The first uses
her elite status and environmental lawyer credentials to publish books and address
international arbitration bodies to illustrate how Law 840 violates the Nicaraguan
constitution. The other uses her leadership skills and “campesina” status to mobilize
citizens directly impacted by the canal, and provides a charismatic figure that appeals to
media publicity. This research finds that the “No al Canal” movement utilizes the
language and ideology of the original revolutionary Sandinismo from the 1970’s, which
is in sharp contrast to the anti-environmental and anti-human rights directives of the
current Sandinista administration; helping to further define the ways in which
Sandinismo 2.0 differs greatly from its revolutionary roots. This information is presented
in a chapter titled “Qué Diría Carlos? The Campesino Movement and the Rhetoric of
Resistance to Nicaragua’s ‘Grand Canal.” The chapter is part of a book titled “Stop
Violating our Rights!” Latin American Experiences of Civil Resistance in Contexts of
Violent Conflict; Cécile Mouly and Esperanza Hernández Delgado, editors; to be
published by Palgrave MacMillan in late-2018. The book is currently under review.

Research Questions
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This dissertation addresses the following questions:
1) How has Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega enabled national development
through economic imperialism via the United States, Venezuela, and China while
espousing a strong anti-imperialist rhetoric?
2) Why has Nicaragua promoted renewable energy development funded by
neoliberal development initiatives while simultaneously embracing Venezuelan
fossil fuels and socialist ideology?
3) Why has Nicaragua granted the Chinese a massive legal concession to territorial
and legal rights for an interoceanic canal after centuries of criticism towards the
United States’ efforts to build a similar canal?
4) How do the perceived human and environmental rights violations of the canal
concession and associated law highlight the divergence between the ideals of the
original Sandinista revolutionaries and the current Sandinista administration?

Methods

Geography has a long history of qualitative research analysis. Qualitative
geography is currently flourishing amidst a methodological revolution across the social
sciences and humanities (DeLyser, et al 2010). Quality qualitative research abounds in
academic journals, books, conferences, and dissertations. Past critiques of the
methodological rigor of qualitative geography have largely been refuted, and qualitative
methods are accepted as vital to the practice of human geography. In fact, in the past,
geography could easily be criticized due to its methodological history of using the
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detached observer to effectively hide colonial, gendered, or racist forms of knowledge
(DeLyser, et al 2010). Qualitative research places the researcher within the findings,
instead of relying on detached, neutral observation.

Positionality

To this point, geography has moved beyond a subjective-objective dichotomy that
was once taken for granted, and instead understands that pure objectivity is impossible
because of the lived experiences of the researcher and the research subjects (DeLyser, et
al 2010). This allows for a necessarily subjective research approach that acknowledges
that all knowledge is situated. For example, my identity as a white American female
might make me assume that all women should have access to education and basic rights,
and cause me to criticize women’s exclusion from decision making processes in
Nicaragua. My identity as a former Peace Corps volunteer and USAID project manager
might make me take for granted and/or assume a positive perspective when discussing
neoliberalism’s influence in Nicaragua. Conversely, past negative experiences with
USAID’s neoliberal policies might cause me to be critical of neoliberalism. My academic
background and knowledge of David Harvey and Diana Liverman’s critiques of
neoliberalism could also cause me to take a less favorable perspective.

Rigor and Validity
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Rigor and validity are assured when qualitative research maintains a high quality
conversation between theory and data (Herbert 2010). It is important to note that there are
equally valid approaches to theory within qualitative geography. A deductive approach
begins with a theoretically driven question and then gathers information to analyze and
answer it. This allows more control over the types of data collected, and allows for a clear
conversation between the theory and empirical observations. This deductive process does
not preclude shedding theoretical commitments as the researcher learns from the
research; the qualitative researcher remains perpetually open to the data and constantly
questions the research method (Herbert 2010, Buroway 1998). The grounded theory
approach allows for theory to arise inductively, and for conceptual frameworks to emerge
from interaction with research findings. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive;
both require a rigorous and constant reexamination of theoretical assumptions. Doing so
ensures rigor and validity to research findings (Herbert 2010).

Knowledge Construction

All scientific practices to construct knowledge, no matter how empirical or
quantitative the method, are subject to interpretation (Herbert 2010). This requires
researchers to look back and forth between data and theory to construct knowledge. Also,
all knowledge comes from specific social contexts and therefore can’t be understood in
isolation from that particular context (Flyvbjerg 2001). Qualitative researchers leave the
lab, data sets, and statistical analyses behind to understand phenomena from a personal
perspective, as well as from the perspective of the subjects of study – a process that
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emerges and develops throughout the research process. This requires a creative, openminded, and open-ended approach to data gathering (DeLyser, et al 2010). As such,
research is finished when enough reading, analyzing, and learning has been done to
create a logical, thoughtful, and novel end product that contributes to the larger academic
body, and ideally can be of some use to the world outside of academia. One qualitative
method that can be useful in geographic research is discourse analysis.

Discourse Analysis

Discourse is a notoriously messy term to define within human geography and
other social sciences due to the complicated variety of meanings associated with it
(Dittmer 2010). Generally speaking, discourse refers to the way language is phrased and
the choice of words used. The way that issues and spaces are described through this
textual form of discourse (also known as textual analysis) is the most empirically
observable way to understand how language shapes the social world (Dittmer 2010).
However, the bigger picture discourse, with which academics are usually concerned,
refers to a culturally-specific mode of existence that comes from the combination
material texts with other forms of communication such as interactions, symbolic acts,
technologies, visual media, body language, and the like. The world becomes recognizable
through recognition of and interaction with the various discourses that create meaning
and convey power in our everyday lives (Dittmer 2010).
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Lees (2004) discusses two different theoretical strands of discourse analysis. The
first stems from the Marxist tradition of political economy and ideology critique, as
serves as a tool for uncovering hegemonic ways of thinking. Here discourse is almost
synonymous with ideology because it conceals the power of vested interests and garners
the consent of the dominated over their own domination (Lees 2004). The second strand
stems from Michel Focault’s work on poststructuralist theory. He explains that discourses
explain their own ‘regimes of truth’ and are part of processes that create things and
identities (Lees 2004). Waitt (2005) explains that a Foucauldian approach to discourse
analysis allows human geographers to investigate regimes of truth that naturalize ways of
seeing social differences, places, or bio-physical environments.

Performing actual discourse analysis may include a combination of textual
analysis and discourse analysis, but there is no singular set of steps and procedures for
performing discourse analysis. Johnstone (2008) stresses that across academic disciplines
and genres of research, hundreds of different approaches to discourse analysis can be
observed, and all are methodologically valid. Many examples of discourse analysis can
be found within academic geography, yet very few include explicit discussions of how
the research was undertaken (Dittmer 2010). Hoggart et al. (2002) explain that this is
because discourse analysis is an artisanal process; it is not stable or confined to a
laboratory. Generally speaking, discourse analysis addresses both the rhetorical stance,
claims to authority, and organization of actual texts, and the larger discourse surrounding
it via social context. Fairclough (1992) adds a third element of social practice, which
includes the larger ideologies that house the social context, to his understanding of
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discourse analysis (Dittmer 2010, Lees 2004). Research materials may be organized into
these two or three categories.

Basically, the audience receiving a text is influenced by ideology, which
socializes the cognitive process and gives a particular perspective to the interpretation of
the text. In terms of an end point, discourse analysis produces a situated reading of life’s
phenomena rather than producing a satisfying “truth” (Dittmer 2010). Discourse analysis
as a method is rooted in a fundamental belief that social processes are open ended.
Conceptually, the only thing academics agree upon is that discourse analysis is difficult
to define, difficult to undertake, but is an important method with infinite potential to grow
and contribute to human geography.

This study is primarily interested in better understanding the drivers behind
Venezuela and China’s financial and ideological involvement in Nicaragua. Therefore,
the most appropriate sources for data review and analysis are readily accessible (via the
internet) primary documents such as official laws and policies, international financial
institution reports, and memorandums of understanding; newspaper articles, government
websites, and the like. These kinds of publicly accessible statements avoid the very
common problem of researcher/informant bias and power issues as described by Weiss
(1994), Spradley (1979), and Schensul et al (1999). Ethnographic interviews, focus
groups, and surveys performed by the researcher inevitably garner biased responses from
informants, based on positions of power and perceptions from each party.
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Discourse analysis illustrates hidden motivations behind a text and enables a
better understanding of a problem to show that the essence of that problem, and its
resolution, lie in its assumptions (University of Texas School of Information). Here, the
major assumption to these research questions is that there is indeed an ideological
conflict behind Nicaragua’s ties to US neoliberalism along with Venezuelan socialism.
Discourse analysis of publicly available information was used to show what type of
rhetoric (neoliberal, socialist, etc.) is driving different infrastructure projects. It is a more
appropriate method for examining these issues than ethnographic interviews, focus
groups, or surveys since it avoids issues of bias and is more relevant to the wide lens of
this project. McKinnon (2007) took a similar approach to methods in her article about
development in Thailand, published in the Annals of the Association of American
Geographers. Here, she examined discursive practices of development professionals to
imagine better post-development practices. In another Annals article, Gilbert (2005) uses
discourse analysis to examine neoliberal discourse and proposals for a new economic
space in North America after 9/11.

Phillips and Hardy (2002) explain that social reality is constructed of a series of
discourses, and that it is difficult to understand social interactions without references to
these discourses. Basically, discourse analysts explore the relationship between discourse
and reality. Phillips and Hardy also explain the differences and benefits to discourse
analysis as a method, as opposed to more traditional quantitative or qualitative methods.
For example, quantitative methods that examine specific indicators or statistics to
determine the extent that a concept such as neoliberalism is present in a particular country
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take the concept of neoliberalism for granted. Similarly, Phillips and Hardy explain that
qualitative studies might utilize ethnographic interviews and participant observation to
understand the meaning rather than specific facts about neoliberalism, but still take
neoliberalism itself as a given. They see discourse analysis as a different method
altogether, one which is more interested in the current meaning of neoliberalism today,
and how it might give meaning to a seemingly contradictory set of activities. Discourse
analysis is particularly appropriate as a tool to analyze Nicaragua’s US-Venezuela-China
paradox, as neoliberalism and socialism use very different but equally prominent
language and keywords.

Contribution to current debates

While much research in the field of geography uses specific case studies and local
or small-scale examples to deepen geographic understanding of a given topic, this
dissertation takes a wide view and tackles apparent contradictions in Nicaragua’s political
economy. This research parses rhetoric from reality in a careful examination of
Nicaragua’s development paradigm as a paradox of neoliberal development initiatives
and socialist ideology. Over the past decade, Nicaragua has entertained substantive
allegiances with the United States, Venezuela, and China in order to improve its
economic status, and to maintain Daniel Ortega’s presidency through multiple terms.
This conflict is highlighted as Nicaragua attempts to improve its economic status through
economic allegiances in the name of infrastructure improvement, but these allegiances
have political motivations as well as human rights implications.
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Chapter three, “Imperialism Three Ways: The political economy of Sandinismo
2.0”, expands the discussion surrounding what constitutes imperialism, and how the “new
left” in Latin America interprets neoliberalism. Specifically, it addresses the call from the
Cahiers des Ameriques latines:
“thirty-eight years after the triumph of the original Sandinista revolution, and over
a decade after the FSLN’s return to power in 2006, the time is clearly ripe for an
evaluation of both the profound transformations undergone by Sandinismo as well
as the reality of its impact on contemporary Nicaragua. This special issue will
therefore explore both the nature of Sandinismo 2.0, as well as the specificities of
a contemporary Nicaraguan political economy that is simultaneously increasingly
exclusive and oligarchic in nature, remains integrated within the Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), is considered a ‘model pupil’
by the IMF, has become the site for major international infrastructural
investments, is increasingly authoritarian, but is also the site of a diverse array of
varied forms of social protests. As such, it hopes to explore the relationship
between revolution, political mobilization, and global and local political
economy.”
Chapter four, “The Political Economy of Energy Development in Nicaragua,”
addresses the apparent conflict between Nicaragua’s embrace of neoliberal funding for
renewable energy development and Venezuela’s financial support via subsidized oil.
Many studies analyze Nicaragua’s renewable energy initiatives from various perspectives
(Negri 2013, Rebane and Barham 2011, Jacobs et al 2013, Brunnschweiler 2010). Other
literature examines Nicaragua’s growing ideological and economic ties to Venezuela and
its oil resources (Wilm 2011, Perla and Cruz-Feliciano 2013). This chapter will
contribute to the body of research on political economy among the “New Left” in Latin
America. It also makes a meaningful contribution to energy geography and political
economy within geography.
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Chapter five of this dissertation addresses JLAG’s call for more overtly critical
geography, specifically that “critical Latin Americanist geography must be …. committed
to the disassembly of unequal power structures throughout the region” (Finn and Hanson
2016). It also addresses this special issue’s request for “inquiries into the forms of
agency exercised by multiple actors constituting China-Latin America/Latin AmericaChina relations wherever they occur.” Specifically, this article will address “economic
geography – trade, politics, and differing models of state-capital relations” and political
geography and geopolitics via “competing hegemonies within Latin America and the
Caribbean” using the Nicaragua canal as a case study.

Chapter 6 contributes a chapter to a book that will be
“the first of its kind to cover a broad range of civil resistance campaigns that have
taken place in contexts of violent conflict in Latin America. Only few books (e.g.
Kaplan 2017b; Barter 2016; Hernández 2004, 2012; Hernández and Salazar 1999)
focus on civil resistance in contexts of violent conflict, and these only cover a
limited number of cases, all in situations of armed conflict. More generally, to our
knowledge, no book on civil resistance focuses specifically on Latin America,
despite its wealth of experiences of nonviolent struggles.” (Hernández and Mouly
2017).
The intention of this book is to unique contributions to scholars in the field and to
practitioners of such initiatives. Specifically, it hopes to compare the different
experiences of civil resistance that have occurred in nine countries in the region, and
draw lessons learned. Each chapter examines the ways in which civil resistance has taken
place, and challenges and influencing factors to the outcomes of the civil resistance.
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CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND

Theoretical Framework

At its core, this dissertation attempts to understand the drivers behind the
decisions the current Ortega administration has made regarding Nicaragua’s
development. Each of the chapters analyzes the discourse surrounding Nicaragua’s
economic development using specific case studies, including Venezuela’s financial
support of Nicaragua between 2007-2013, and China’s investment in the proposed
interoceanic canal. Because Ortega uses strong socialist rhetoric while maintaining
neoliberal development policies, it is prudent to examine the prevailing development
paradigms. Many recent scholars suggest that 21st century socialism, or the emergence of
the “New Left” in Latin America indeed embodies both socialism and neoliberalism.

Debates between German and Austrian economists in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries resulted in political economic theories that ultimately spawned neoliberalism
(Peet and Hartwick 2009). Neoliberalism is the current prevailing development paradigm
for most of the world, and comes with its requisite critics and advocates. David Harvey
(2005) defines neoliberalism as a theory of political and economic practices that seeks to
advance development by promoting entrepreneurship within an institutional framework
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founded on private property rights, free markets, and free trade. Milton Freidman was
crucial in promoting the neoliberal economic model adopted by the Reagan
administration in the 1980s. Neoliberalism promulgated through Latin America via Chile
and students who were educated in neoliberal principals at the Chicago School of
Economics and became advisors to the Chilean government along with Milton Friedman
during the dictatorial Pinochet regime.

By the early 1990s, John Williamson of the Institute for International Economics
had coined the term “Washington Consensus” to describe the set of policy reforms debtor
countries in Latin America needed to undertake in order to gain control of their financial
situations. These policy instruments include fiscal discipline, reducing public
expenditures, tax reform, market-determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates,
trade liberalization, encouraging foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation,
and secure property rights (Peet and Hartwick 2009). The International Monetary Fund
and World Bank enabled these reforms by providing loans for development projects;
however this created a culture of heavy indebtedness amongst developing countries. In
the early 2000s, the Millennium Development Goals were established as part of the
augmented Washington Consensus by the United Nations Development Program to
reduce extreme poverty and provide basic human rights including shelter, education,
health, and security. The UNDP does not administer funding to help countries meet these
goals, rather funding for debt relief from the IMF, World Bank and other international
donors target projects related to these goals.
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Jeffery Sachs is another vocal advocate for the neoliberal model; though over time
he has softened his position. Sachs has questioned why Latin America seem poised to
take the development leap 100 years ago; while still boasting the same levels of
underdevelopment at the turn of the 21st century. Sachs criticizes the region’s poor record
for innovation, and the ability to develop and absorb technology; as well as a lack of
competitiveness or integration into the world economy, and poor legal and regulatory
frameworks for business. He also links weak economic growth to weak public institutions
and governance. Sachs cautions that success is dependent on each country’s ability to
tackle all of these challenges at once; a tall order for many countries.

In addition to the reasons listed above, Sachs relies on environmental determinism
to explain away this pervasive underdevelopment. Sachs has also made the argument that
over a billion people (one fifth of the world’s population) are still too poor to take the
first step on the ladder out of poverty, a situation that the developed world should
address. He outlines his thesis in his 2005 book, The End of Poverty: Economic
possibilities for our time. Harvard economic historian David Landes uses a similar
approach in his influential book, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why some countries
are so rich and some are so poor (1998). Both of these popular books provide a
contemporary defense of the modernization theory, which basically promotes European
exceptionalism and environmental determinism.

Neoliberalism may be the prevailing development paradigm of today, but it is not
without critics on many levels. Political scientist Richard Harris (2008) sees the recent
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movement against neoliberalism and globalization (especially in the more left-leaning
Latin American countries) as an opportunity for stronger civil society and better regional
integration. He views the neoliberal development agenda imposed by the US,
transnational corporations, and international financial institutions (namely the IMF,
World Bank, and IDB) as the main factors responsible for lagging economic, political,
and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean (Harris 2008).

Geographers such as Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick are also staunch critics of
neoliberalism. They reject the ideal that privatization, markets, and optimal pricing can
solve all problems, claiming that economics is paralyzed by its socially restricted vision
and simplistic assumptions of human behavior. They also state that the motivation to
provide development aid should not come from a desire to prevent terrorism or
modernize countries; rather it should stem from the critical understanding that the
extreme wealth of the few has caused the extreme poverty of many. They believe that
Western imperialist expansion destroyed civilizations that were otherwise doing well, and
development aid should be seen as reparations for past damage (Peet and Hartwick 2009).

Geographers Diana Liverman and Silvina Vilas (2006) examine the
neoliberalization of environmental issues in Latin America and find that results are
mixed. Some places have benefited from neoliberal policies while other places have seen
the political volatility of neoliberalism on social and environmental issues. The lack of
detailed and balanced case studies makes ultimate success difficult to judge. Liverman
and Vilas conclude that there is little evidence that neoliberalism protects the
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environment in Latin America, nor is there evidence that state regulation and common
ownership would be affordable or effective management techniques in a global economy.
Geographer David Harvey is also a staunch critic of the neoliberal model; understandably
since he is one of the most prolific proponents of Marxist theory today.

Marxism implies collective social control over the development process and is a
philosophy of social existence (Peet and Hartwick 2009). For Marx, development was a
process of capital accumulation occurring unevenly over class and space, and was a
contradictory (and at times violent) process due to the necessity of exploitation and
competition to achieve development. Further, economic development for Marx happens
by building up the forces of production such as tools, machines, infrastructure, and
human labor. Marx developed these ideas in the mid 1800s, but they did not emerge as
prevailing political models until socialism gained traction in the early and mid 1900s.

Marxism provides the basic foundations for socialism, which implies state
ownership of means of production, such as infrastructure and natural resources. Socialist
states are supposed to be controlled democratically by citizens and their economies based
on cooperation instead of competition, with economics and resources collectively
managed by the state for the benefit of the majority (O’Lear 2006). Socialist principles
are the direct opposite of neoliberalism’s emphasis on decentralization and privatization.
Latin America is seeing a resurgence of socialist governments as a direct reaction to
failed neoliberal development policies and perceived US imperialism in the region.
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Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador all have turned to increasingly
leftist development models and government systems in recent years.

Marxist geography began to emerge in the mid-1970’s, with Richard Peet calling
for more attention to societal contradictions and awareness of the Marxist principal of
inevitable inequality in a capitalist society (Peet 1975, 1979). Harvey (1979) showed how
ideology could influence the character of place, and Nicaragua is a prime example of this.
In fact, David Harvey is one of the most influential human geographers and founders of
Marxist geography, which warrants a closer look at his career and publications. In 1969,
Harvey published Explanation in Geography, which was an important geographic
methods and philosophy work. In 1973 he published his first major work with a Marxist
bent, Social Justice in the City, which examined the injustices of capitalism as related to
urbanism. Limits to Capital (1983) solidified his Marxist perspective and looked for ways
to account for capital accumulation over time and space. The Condition of Postmodernity
(1989) identified flexible accumulation in contemporary capitalism (Toscano 2007).
Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference (1996) focused on social and
environmental justice. In 2003, he published The New Imperialism, in response to the
Iraq war, followed by A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), and in 2010, The Enigma
of Capital addressed the current economic crisis.

The 75th anniversary issue of the Annals in 1979 highlighted Marxist geography,
as ideology and politics had become an overt theme in geographic publications
(Kobayashi 2010). The prevalence of Marxism garnered much debate in the early 80’s,
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after King’s (1979) call for more discussion and debate between humanistic and Marxist
geographers. This prompted a long debate published in the Annals critiquing structural
Marxism in geography (Duncan and Ley 1982). This led to the poststructuralist model
that prevailed in the 1990s. Kobayashi (2010) explains poststructuralism as a perspective
that recognizes structure as a product of human actions, and rejects environmental
determinism – effectively blending the ideas of humanist and Marxist geographers. The
most important outcome of this movement has been the emphasis on analyzing the ways
that people create difference through economic, social, political, and cultural practices
(Kobayashi 2010).

Dependency theory stems from the idea that European and US development was
predicated on the active underdevelopment of the global south (Peet and Hartwick 2009).
Andre Gunder Frank (1989) elaborates on dependency theory and posits that it is
essential to understand how past economic and social histories explain underdevelopment
in many countries. He dismisses the “dual society” thesis where underdeveloped
countries have one part that has been positively affected by the capitalist world, and the
other part remains isolated, and subsistence-based; or “precapitalist.” Rather, he suggests
that capitalism has reached even the most remote corners of the globe and that uneven
development can be ascribed precisely to the historical development of the capitalist
system. Ilan Kapoor (2002) uses both dependency and postcolonial theory to explain
underdevelopment in Latin America. Like Frank, he claims that Latin America was
‘undeveloped’ in pre-colonial times, but was ‘underdeveloped’ as soon as capitalism
arrived. However, Kapoor evokes postcolonial theory’s shortcomings to highlight
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dependency’s strengths, and vice-versa. While dependency adopts a modernist
framework that is totalizing and ethnocentric, postcolonial theory inadequately analyzes
socioeconomic inequality promulgated by capitalist modernity.

The United States’ distaste for socialism during the cold war era led to what may
be explained as neo-imperialism. Political realists such as Joseph Tulchin and Jorge
Dominguez explain how the United States intervened in Latin America’s development
for political purposes, particularly during the Cold War. Tulchin (1998) argues that the
events of the 1960s, particularly the Alliance for Progress and the Cuban Missile Crisis,
challenged the previously held Monroe Doctrine-esque policies of laissez faire Latin
American Policy. The US was extremely sensitive to the rise of dictatorships - and
therefore Soviet influence - in Latin America in the 1950s. The United States perception
that their model was respected by all nations was shattered when Richard Nixon was
stoned during a visit to Venezuela. In response, the US launched the first iteration of
what arguably became the Alliance for Progress, based on the belief that economic
development and democracy go hand-in-hand. In spite of increased attention and
development funding (which Latin America had been after since the end of WWII); the
1960’s ended with the Cuban Missile Crisis, highlighting just what a strong role the Cold
War played in US – Latin America relations.

Jorge Dominguez (1999) argues that during this time, “ideological considerations
acquired a primacy over US policy in the region that it had lacked at earlier moments.”
Dominguez argues that US policy was illogical in that the instruments chosen to
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implement US policy were often disproportionate, costly, and inappropriate to the goals
sought. This specifically refers to the numerous times the US intervened in various
countries to overthrow perceived dictatorships (or administrations perceived as a threat to
US interests in the region), seen as a type of neoimperialism by Peet and Hartwick
(2009). Undoubtedly, this interventionist stance has left a lasting scar on US-Latin
American relations. The current iteration of the Alliance for Progress can be seen through
USAID presence, in spite of resistance from many left-leaning countries. The US
continues to fund “regional security initiatives” through Plan Colombia, the Merida
Initiative, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative as a way to keep a proverbial iron
in the fire.

Political Economy for Nicaragua

In order to undertake megaprojects such as interoceanic canals or energy supply
reform, politics and economics must conspire to enable these types of massive
investments that have broad impacts on local people as well as national economic
interests. The framework of political economy encompasses development theories such
as political realism, regionalization, and neoliberalism (Cohen-Tanugi 2007, Jilberto and
Mommen 1998, Sachs 2005). Political economy is the most appropriate lens with which
to examine energy and trans-oceanic canal development in Nicaragua because political
agenda coupled with financial considerations are the key drivers to major energy policy
and infrastructure development. While it might also be prudent to examine Nicaragua’s
energy and infrastructure development through a political ecology lens, given the implicit
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environmental impacts megaprojects and energy infrastructure carry, financial concerns
speak louder than environmental concerns. In fact, the theoretical framework of political
ecology was borne from the larger lens of political economy. Before writing the seminal
political ecology book Liberation Ecologies (Peet and Watts 1996) Richard Peet and
Nigel Thrift edited New Models in Geography: The political-economy perspective,
published in 1989. Peet and Thrift’s two-volume work is a compilation of articles that
reflect models of political economy within geography and include topics such as new
models of environment and resources, new models of uneven development and regional
change, and new models of the nation, state, and politics.

In discussions surrounding Nicaragua’s development, two models prevail, namely
neoliberalism and socialism (Tatar 2009, Wilm 2011, Perla and Cruz-Feliciano 2013).
David Harvey (2005) defines neoliberalism as a theory of political and economic
practices that seeks to advance development by promoting entrepreneurship within an
institutional framework founded on private property rights, free markets, and free trade.
Critics (Tatar 2009, Wilm 2011) argue that failed neoliberal policy driven by the United
States’ hegemonic influence is responsible for Nicaragua’s lack of development and
recent return to more socialist ideals and policy. That neoliberalism is being blamed for
Nicaragua’s development failure is not unique, but Nicaragua’s political climate over the
last several decades is quite remarkable compared to other developing countries. Marti
and Close (2012) explain that Nicaragua’s case is outstanding not only for its pluralistic
revolutionary government, but also its return to democracy in 1984 and acceptance of
electoral defeat in 1990. That the revolutionary FSLN (Sandinista) party returned to
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power with Daniel Ortega’s election in 2007 make Nicaragua’s politics all the more
remarkable.

While the 1979 revolution is described as a reaction to increasing American
presence in Nicaragua, the decades since have been a delicate balance of neoliberal and
socialist political paradigms, switching with the winds of the economy and will of the
people (Tatar 2009, Wilm 2011). Ortega’s return to power in 2007 reflected a regional
shift towards socialist governments, with the large personalities of Hugo Chavez and Evo
Morales setting the tone for Latin America. Ortega came back into power embracing the
economic policies of neoliberalism and the social policies of socialism, claiming to think
with both his head and heart (Marti and Close, 2012).

The Political Economy of Megaprojects in Nicaragua

Bent Flyvbjerg (2003) identifies the multibillion-dollar large-scale infrastructure
project as a new political and physical presence in all parts of the world. These
megaprojects include many types of large-scale infrastructure projects including
transportation, energy, and water systems. These projects are large not only in physical
size, such as a massive dam or port, but also tend to transform space and create new
mobilities such as telecommunications lines, transportation networks, or energy
transmission. Flyvbjerg posits that these projects have led to the “end of geography” and
now form a utopian “Zero-Friction Society” where people, goods, energy, information,
and money can cross previously prohibitive time and space with unprecedented ease.
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Flyvbjerg (2003) cautions that this new and improved world is not without its flaws.
Megaprojects inherently suffer from various risks including cost overruns, unrealistic
expectations of benefits, and disregard for potential environmental and social issues.
Gunton (2003) suggests that megaprojects are undertaken in spite of potential failure
because of errors in evaluation methodology and interest group motivations for regional
resource development. Flyvbjerg suggests four methodological improvements for
managing megaproject risk, including decision-making transparency, performance
specification, utilizing regulatory regimes, and transferring risk to private capital. This
dissertation shows that the Ortega administration has not managed megaproject risk well,
particularly in relation to the proposed interoceanic canal. The lack of transparency,
realism of performance, and legal ramifications of the canal concession have been
roundly criticized by outside observers and Nicaraguan activists.

Nicaragua has a long history of conceptualizing projects such as canals, dams, and
even a space satellite to various degrees, but never realizing their success. However,
Nicaragua has successfully implemented several megaprojects such as renewable energy
infrastructure, free trade zones, and dams. US interests and the neoliberal development
model have historically motivated major infrastructure projects in Nicaragua. Now, China
and Venezuela are increasingly present financially and ideologically in Nicaragua. This
research examines the political economy of megaprojects such as energy infrastructure
and the proposed canal to better understand if Nicaragua’s political interests with the US,
World Bank, private investors, and general neoliberal development policies are main
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drivers; or whether Nicaragua’s socialist ideology and Venezuelan and Chinese economic
support play a greater role in megaproject development.

Feminist Geography

Feminist geography came into focus in the Annals after 2000, with a few notable
exceptions in the late 1990s. Susan Hanson called for more feminist research in human
geography in her 1992 presidential address. Victoria Lawson emphasized the feminist
perspective that geography includes an ethic of care and responsibility in research
methods and subject in her 2007 presidential address (Kobayashi 2010). By the end of the
20th century, one of the most striking changes in human geography was the expansion
into looking at why and how, in addition to the more traditional, inventory dominated
activity of simply exploring what and where (Golledge 2002). Kobayashi (2010) sees
current human geography enhanced by rigorous economic, political and social theories to
help explain the relationship between people and place. This dissertation attempts
specifically to address the why and how of Nicaragua’s development, and relies on the
theoretical framework of feminist geography, specifically when analyzing the resistance
movement towards the interoceanic canal in Chapter 6 (Moss 2002, Nelson and Seager
2005, and McDowell 1999).
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Origins of Sandinismo

The following chapters of this dissertation are based on the understanding that the
current Ortega administration’s policies deviate significantly from the original tenets of
Sandinismo that inspired the 1979 revolution. Thus, a more in-depth examination of
Sandinismo is warranted as context for the subsequent chapters.

The origins of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua can be traced back to the
United States’ long history of intervention in the country. The United States’ first overt
attempt at intervention came when American adventurer William Walker took advantage
of internal political struggles between liberals and conservatives in Nicaragua in 1850,
and declared himself president. Popular resistance and a Central American army
ultimately defeated Walker, but the US returned in the early 1909 to overthrow liberal
president Jose Zelaya, replacing him with conservative Adolfo Diaz (Booth 1985). This
marked the start of the US’s military occupation and Nicaraguan banks, railroads, and
customs office were given to American bankers (Zimmerman 2000). In 1914, the BryanChammoro treaty gave the United States eternal rights to build a canal across Nicaragua,
and the never ratified Castillo-Knox treaty effectively outlined US financial control over
Nicaragua for decades to come (Booth 1985). This effectively weakened the Nicaraguan
government and intensified fighting among liberal and conservative factions. In 1927 the
US government, ever fearful of socialism, brokered a peace treaty between liberals and
conservatives that kept the conservatives in power for the time being, but allowed for
liberal victory if free and fair elections were held down the road. All but one liberal
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general involved in the negotiations signed the peace treaty, and that general was the
Augusto Cesar Sandino.

Augusto Sandino’s formative years were spent with his father (an ardent liberal)
and taking different jobs across the region. His populist and idealist ideology solidified
while working for a petroleum company in Mexico. He was never fully Marxist; his main
driving conviction was that the United States had no right to invade a small country and
dominate it (Booth 1985). He returned to Nicaragua in 1926 to fight with the liberal
cause. No one took him seriously at first, but he was able to gather a force of guerrilla
fighters that continued to battle the US marine occupation over six years, after all of the
other liberal generals had declared a truce. Sandino’s success gained him support in
Nicaragua, and made the American military occupation increasingly unpopular in the US,
ultimately leading to the withdrawal of US troops in 1933 amidst a very grim global
economic situation.

Anastasio Somoza Garcia was installed as head of the US trained Guardia
Nacional, and quickly began to dismantle the neutrality that the US so carefully tried to
instill in the military. Because Somoza was a liberal, and appointed as the head of the
most powerful element in a weak state, he had to gain the trust of the majority
conservative National Guard higher-ups. To do so, Somoza ordered Sandino’s
assassination in 1934. While Somoza was able to wield his power into a 46-year family
run dictatorship, many are critical of Sandino’s lack of greater ambition. However, Booth
(2000) posits that Sandino wasn’t motivated by anything other than stopping United
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States intervention in Nicaragua, a goal he achieved when the marines retreated in 1933.
Booth also maintains that Sandino’s rebel movement wasn’t guided by a specific
ideology or strong organization, making Sandino the ultimate tragic figure whose efforts
were ultimately overcome by powers common to Nicaragua’s political history including
conspiracy, ambition, and betrayal.

Sandinismo 1.0 and the origins of the FSLN

Sandino’s assassination elevated his national hero status to the highest level, and
his memory and general ideology was resurrected when Carlos Fonseca used his example
to ultimately inspire a revolution against the Somoza regime, which was in power until
1979. Carlos Fonseca became increasingly interested in Marxism and joined the
Communist party as a teenager in the early 1950s. He wrote for the party’s newspaper,
promoting it around Matagalpa, and was particularly concerned with the poor living
conditions of the working class. Much dissatisfaction with the Somoza dynasty stemmed
from its close embrace of U.S. imperialism. Fonseca recruited members into the first
student-only Communist party organization, but was never truly enamored with pure
Communist teachings; at this point he still believed in non-violence and more moderate
Marxist approaches. By 1959 he published a book, A Nicaraguan in Moscow, detailing
his experience as a delegate to a Communist youth convention. This book was strikingly
dissimilar to later publications, as it openly accepted the Nicaraguan Communist party’s
assertion that the country needed a long process of organized labor reform rather than a
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revolution; it didn’t mention Sandino, and it openly praised the USSR (Zimmerman
2000).

The Cuban revolution garnered much excitement amongst Nicaraguan opposition
to the Somoza regime. Fonseca became particularly interested in what was happening in
Cuba and joined an early, Cuban-backed guerrilla movement to overthrow Somoza.
However, Fonseca was nearly killed due to poor leadership, and learned a great deal
about the leadership required to lead a successful revolution. While this experience
solidified his commitment to Che Guevara’s revolutionary guerrilla movement, it also
caused him to ultimately break ties with the Nicaraguan Communist party and start his
own in 1962, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación
Nacional), or FSLN. Fonseca was adamant that revolution could not occur without an
armed struggle, while the Nicaraguan Communist party disagreed. The Nicaraguan
Communist party and the FSLN were in competition throughout the 1960s and 70’s, with
the Communist party condemning the FSLN as suicidal adventurists (Zimmerman 2000).

Fonseca’s interest in Sandino was solidified at this time as well. Cuba had a
revolutionary ideologue in Jose Marti, and the Cubans were aware of Sandino’s
revolutionary accomplishments. During the early 1960s, Fonseca worked hard to
differentiate the FSLN from the Nicaraguan Communist party, but it failed to adopt a
clear Marxist/Leninist ideology early on. In 1967, the National Guard shot and killed 100
of 50,000 anti-Somoza demonstrators, prompting a FSLN guerrilla operation
(Zimmerman 2000). By the late 60s, Fonseca was encouraging FSLN student groups to
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take up a clear Marxist ideology and to become more revolutionary rather than sit idly
watching the efforts of the FSLN in the field. It is important to contextualize that the
FSLN was not nearly as powerful as the non-revolutionary, reform oriented anti-Somoza
student movement in Nicaragua, throughout the 1960s.

In 1969, the FSLN adopted Hora Zero and the Programa Historica, outlining for
the first time a set of clear ideology and demands, on which the 1979 revolution would
ultimately be based. Main points included overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship and
guarantee basic democratic rights, repatriating the Somoza dynasty’s sizable assets to the
Nicaraguan people, ending US interference in Nicaragua, and replacing the National
Guard with a more neutral militia. The Programa also demanded land reform on a
massive scale, and social reform programs including basic education, social security,
anti-discrimination of women and minorities, and fair labor practices.

Fonseca then turned his attention to cultivating the image and ideology of
Augusto Sandino into a motivator and guide for the FSLN’s ultimate revolution, and
published five major texts on Sandino between 1970 and 1975 (Zimmerman 2000). He
emphasized Sandino’s actions and his class-oriented and nationalist writings to appeal to
students and farmers who identified with Sandino as a fighter, to bolster his ideological
stance with other members of the FSLN leadership, and to further distinguish the FSLN
from the Communist party’s idea that socialist revolution was impossible in the near
future. The early 1970’s also marked growing factionalism amongst the FSLN itself, and
the party broke into three separate political groups: the Prolonged People’s War
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Tendency (Guerra Prolongada Popular, GPP), the Proletarian Tendency (Tendencia
Proletaria, TP), and the Insurrectional or Third Tendency (Tendencia Insurrectional, TI)
(Zimmerman 2000).

It is important to note that Fonseca and other FSLN leaders spent much of this
time exiled from Nicaragua, or in jail; organizing from a far, which further hindered the
strength of the FSLN within Nicaragua. The GPP was the only faction that had leadership
still in Nicaragua, and Daniel Ortega was a secondary leader in the TI. Fonseca himself
was exiled in Havana and did not directly ally with any of the three groups; the groups’
differences were ultimately hard to distinguish. Tensions were growing after the Somoza
regime’s misappropriation (or theft) of recovery aid after the 1972 earthquake. The
bourgeois opposition also began to solidly question the Somoza regime after its harsh
crackdown after the FSLN took hostages in 1974. Somoza launched a wave of terror in
the countryside, including bombing, burning, and napalming villages; disappearances;
rapes; and concentration camps - resulting in over 3000 deaths. Fonseca had always been
determined to return to Nicaragua to lead guerrilla troops and mend the divide within the
party. He succeeded in returning in 1975 and had to stay in hiding wherever he was.
Carlos Fonseca was killed by a National Guard ambush in the mountains in 1976.

Sandinismo after Fonseca

Fonseca’s death left the Somozas elated and the rest of the country in disbelief.
The guerrilla forces in the mountains had dwindled to only 11 troops and the TI
	
  

35

leadership was the strongest remaining faction of the FSLN (Zimmerman 2000). The TI
still subscribed to the two-stage theory of revolution, most closely resembling that of the
Nicaraguan Communist party. Since the mid 1960s, Fonseca had argued against the idea
that the bourgeois must first take control of the country from the dictatorial regime and
imperialist influence so that the working class could then gain power. Humberto Ortega,
Daniel Ortega, and Victor Tirado were the only functioning members of the TI left on the
National Directorate, and as such they assumed control of the FSLN. However, they
issued a much more moderate “General Political-Military Platform of the FSLN” in 1977,
which gave much attention to Sandino, but only mentioned Fonseca once and failed to
include the Cuban revolution at all (Zimmerman 2000). This Tendency was the most
politically moderate, but the most militarily aggressive.

Protests against Somoza escalated in 1978 when conservative opposition leader
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was assassinated on his way to work. This time period of
Somoza’s repressive tactics also mobilized tens of thousands of young Nicaraguans to
join the FSLN, effectively reuniting the party as most people cared about inciting
revolution, not debating the finer points of political strategy. In March of 1979, the FSLN
officially reunified, bringing three men from each tendency to create a joint National
Directorate (Zimmerman 2000). This helped the image that there were only two sides in
the conflict – the FSLN versus the Somoza regime, and the United States was
unsurprisingly interested in making sure that the FSLN was not left with total control of
the government.
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The FSLN conceded a role in the post-Somoza government where the bourgeois
opposition would be guaranteed a controlling role. The post revolutionary government
included Daniel Ortega, Moises Hassan, and Sergio Ramirez from the FSLN; and
Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro from the opposition. Robelo and Chamorro were
chosen because they identified with the Sandinista revolution, though Chamorro held her
position only briefly. On July 16, 1979 Somoza resigned and fled Nicaragua, and by July
19 the FSLN had taken power. The new government was greeted in Managua with
celebrations bearing portraits of Sandino and Fonseca and cheers of Fonseca’s name –
proving that his revolutionary vision was alive and well in the new Nicaragua
(Zimmerman 2000).

Sandinistas out of power?

The FSLN stayed in power until 1990; in spite of the ongoing US-funded Contra
war. The Sandinistas realized they needed to hold free and fair elections to keep
European aid money and appease the increasingly violent Contra war. However, the civil
war’s 30,000 casualties, weak economy, and relentless US intervention caused the
FSLN’s loss of power in the 1990 elections (Kinzer 1991). Ortega recognized his defeat
(rare in Nicaraguan history) but promised to continue to fight on and govern from below.
Though not in power in the highest ranks of office, the FSLN far from disappeared from
the political scene. During the Chamorro administration (1990 – 1996), the Sandinistas
used the time to reassert the party’s national identity as a revolutionary organization;
accomplishing this by staging violent, disruptive protests while making deals with the
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government (Close and Marti i Puig 2012). The Chamorro administration also marked a
period of aggressive neoliberal economic policies, which ultimately had little success in
improving the economy for Nicaragua’s poorest citizens (Walker 2003). Interestingly,
tourism grew as an industry during these post-Sandinista years, capitalizing on the
neoliberal development draw of tourism in a revolutionary country (Babb 2004).

Arnaldo Aleman ruled from 1996 – 2001, thanks to the endorsement of the
archbishop of Managua. Aleman had been jailed by the FSLN in the late 1980s, but he
was able to find mutually beneficial ways to work with Daniel Ortega. The first joint
venture they undertook was settling a law that dealt with real estate expropriated by the
revolutionary government. The other issue they addressed, which is still currently
functioning, was the foundation of a political Pact to ensure that the Constitutional
Liberal Party (PLC) and the FSLN were the only two political parties that would be in
power. Basically, the party in power offers the other party smaller power roles, such as
guaranteed government jobs. This worked because the opposition party knew that the
government would continue to win elections by fraud so the best option was to use the
jobs for opposition supporters in order to keep the party alive. Much decision-making
between elections was made outside of formal institutions, via negotiations between
Aleman and Ortega. The Pact also strengthened the executive office (at the expense of
accountability and other branches of government) and turned other government agencies
into party strongholds (Close and Marti i Puig 2012).
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Even though president Enrique Bolaños was able to convict Aleman of over $100
million in fraud to the government, he was increasingly at the mercy of Daniel Ortega,
though Ortega’s power was limited to an assembly seat. The FSLN was at fist supportive
of the Bolaños administration’s pursuit of Aleman, but after pressure from the US, the
president began to turn away from the revolutionary party. The Aleman – Ortega Pact
had provided for a candidate to be elected president with 35 percent of the vote, allowing
an Ortega victory when the two parties divided into four, prior to the 2006 general
elections (Close and Marti i Puig 2012). The two new parties included the Sandinista
Renewal Movement (Movimiento Renovador Sandinista or MRS) on the left, and the
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal Nicaraguense or ALN) on the right. Both
opposed the Aleman – Ortega Pact.

The Movimiento Renovador Sandinista movement (MRS) only received 6 percent
of the 2006 vote, but is still a visible force (Close and Marti i Puig 2012). A founding
member, Sergio Ramirez, was put forth as the MRS candidate in the 2008 election, but
Ortega’s FSLN party declared it illegal for the MRS to have a candidate in the election.
Wilm (2011) found that the MRS is mostly used as a party for Nicaraguans who still
identify with the FSLN, but do not like Daniel Ortega for various reasons. The MRS of
today does not seem to have a cohesive ideology; rather it can serve as a refuge for
Nicaraguans seeking an alternative from “Danielismo.” Indeed, Daniel Ortega has taken
increasing credit for his role in the Sandinista revolution and is featured in an overly
prominent role in the Museum of the Sandinista Victory. His picture is displayed on
billboards across the country, alongside pictures of Sandino. In an LA Times interview,
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Sergio Ramirez says that it is like all other contributors to the revolution have been
erased (Wilkinson 2010). It is common to hear Nicaraguans talk about Danielismo rather
than Sandinismo, due to the leader’s cult of personality and the fact that Ortega’s version
of Sandinismo has strayed from Fonseca’s original vision. Tatar (2009) describes how
social memories can produce a dominant political language.

Current Sandinismo

The FSLN’s return to power in 2007 came at a time when the US’s neoliberaldriven Washington Consensus was waning and the US’s attention was elsewhere. The
Sandinista’s reelection was also part of the broader Bolivarian movement led by
Venezuela, and Hugo Chavez was able to help finance the FSLN’s victory. In returning
to office, Chavez did not completely nationalize all industries, preferring instead to allow
for free market competition in most areas. He did, however implement new social
programs and has embraced an actively redistributive social policy. The first part focused
on poverty alleviation by implementing anti hunger, unemployment and usury programs.
The second part was to eliminate all user fees for schools and hospitals, though the
government failed to budget for these ends. While the programs might be well conceived,
the Ortega administration appears to be administering them to maximize partisan goals
rather than development (Close and Marti i Puig 2012).

While he was administering social redistribution programs, Ortega was embracing
the same neoliberal economic policies his conservative predecessors had implemented
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since 1990. This includes participation in the Central American and Dominican Republic
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and accepting aid money from the IMF, World
Bank, and bilateral donors such as the United States and European countries. Financing
from Venezuela has been accepted with open arms, particularly related to subsidized oil
and social programs, but Ortega has become particularly vocal in aligning with
Venezuela’s socialist ideology. Close and Marti i Puig (2012) estimate that the amount of
financial support that Nicaragua gets from just one of several cooperative agreements it
has with Venezuela amount to more than the entire aid contributions of western
governments, combined. This financial support allows Ortega to be less careful with his
bellicose, anti-US, anti-imperialist rhetoric and to align his foreign policy with more
socialist, like-minded states such as China, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Boliva, and Ecuador.

Indeed, Nicaragua is an active member in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which was conceived as an alternative to the United
States’ proposal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2003. ALBA currently acts as a
trade alliance between ideological allies in the region including Antigua and Barbuda,
Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and
Venezuela. ALBA has even proposed its own currency to more easily facilitate economic
integration among the block. Nicaragua has recently signed another trade agreement to
solidify its allegiance with ALBA even after the death of Hugo Chavez (Rogers 2013).
The agreement, known as ECOALBA-TCP, “the peoples trade treaty” is supposed to
promote more economic integration, cooperation, and fair trade between ALBA
countries. It also promotes protectionism, economic sovereignty, and the strong role of
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the state, and denounces other trade agreements as “capitalist and vile” (Rogers 2013). In
spite of this, Nicaragua continues to be an active participant in trade with the US under
CAFTA-DR.

This newfound confidence in his financial and ideological relationship with
Venezuela has allowed Ortega to advance rhetoric promoting various projects and
initiatives such as an oil refinery and shipment point on the Pacific Coast. Because
Nicaragua’s financial relationship with Venezuela does not require strict accountability
with funding, Ortega has not been pressured to make these kinds of big promises reality.
This financial security has also allowed Ortega to use harsh rhetoric against the United
States, threatening to expel US-funded aid projects and denouncing US imperialism,
while in reality taking the necessary steps to avoid actually jeopardizing his political or
financial relationship with the US. Most importantly, Venezuelan financing has allowed
Ortega not only the means by which to endear himself to the majority of Nicaraguans
who continue to live in poverty, through social programs that provide roofing materials or
literacy campaigns; but also has financed his ability to re-write the constitution to allow
for consecutive terms as president.

Upon his return to office, Ortega declared that his heart was with the left, but
because he is responsible, his head is to the right (Close and Marti i Puig 2012). Perla and
Cruz-Feliciano (2013) offer a theory explaining the apparent contradictions in policies
and rhetoric versus realized actions. They explain that from a political standpoint, the
domestic opposition confuses the Sandinista party’s tactical decisions with their more
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strategic objectives. Also, critics from the left feel that the party’s revolutionary roots
should be more political than social. Instead, they claim that the new version of socialism
currently playing out in Nicaragua is best seen as a risk-adverse approach, where a
progressive stage of capitalism is necessary to transition fully to socialism by maintaining
positive relationships with the United States and local elites while diversifying regional
and international financial support in order to maintain social reforms. Perla and CruzFeliciano (2013) cite Nicaragua’s participation in CAFTA-DR, criminalization of
abortion, and reservations about international observation of elections as examples of
where this contradiction is most visible.

Even since Hugo Chavez died in 2013 and Venezuela spiraled into an economic
and humanitarian crisis, Daniel Ortega has maintained close ties with Chavez’s
successor, Nicolás Maduro. While Venezuela is unable to provide such robust economic
and in-kind support to Nicaragua, the two leaders have maintained their strong
ideological alliance. In 2016, Ortega secured a third consecutive term in elections that
were roundly criticized as irregular, and were not open to international observers. The
Ortega regime is accused of becoming increasingly autocratic as Ortega’s wife, Rosario
Murillo, was named vice president. While Ortega is a polarizing figure, particularly
among elite members of the original FSLN, his popularity remains unwavering amongst a
base of the Nicaraguan population. Supported by Venezuelan financing, and a careful
balance of socialist and neoliberal economic development policies, Ortega has been able
to grow the Nicaraguan economy at a rate of five percent – double the average for the rest
of Central America. Thus, this dissertation examines the environmental and social
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implications of paradoxical economic ideologies in post-revolutionary Nicaragua via the
political economy of Sandinismo 2.0.
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CHAPTER 3 – IMPERIALISM THREE WAYS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SANDINISMO 2.0

Figure 1: An image of former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in Managua, alongside some of 150
“Trees of Life,” a public art installation designed by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega’s wife, Vice
President Rosario Murillo. The trees were funded by money from Vemezuela. Photo credit: Lindsay
Fendt/The Tico Times

“Imperialism does not grow without a moral base of support within the very populace in
which it has its tentacles.” Augusto Sandino, 1933 (Gobat 2005, from Belausteguigoitia
1933).
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Rhetoric surrounding imperialism has helped to define the political economy of
Sandinismo 2.0 in Nicaragua. The FSLN’s return to power in 2007 was predicated upon
Daniel Ortega’s anti-imperialist rhetoric condemning US involvement in Nicaragua.
Anti-imperialism has been a driver for change in Nicaragua, from William Walker’s
invasion in the 1850’s to Augusto Sandino’s revolt in the 1930’s to the 1979 revolution.
However, Ortega’s selective interpretation of the concept of imperialism has been
paradoxical; he has vocally rejected American “imperialism” and neoliberalism while
embracing free trade and development assistance from the US, World Bank, and IMF.
Ortega has simultaneously embraced other countries’ imperialist practices – primarily
Venezuela’s financial support of Nicaragua through massive oil subsidies, and China’s
pledge to invest billions of dollars in an inter-oceanic canal. These alliances have had and
will continue to have profound implications on Nicaragua’s development.

The idea of imperialism encompasses politically and conceptually distinct modes
of understanding global power and economy (Phillips 2011). Imperialism often refers to
the increase of western hegemony and the spread of the United State’s cultural influence
over other regions throughout the 19th and 20th centuries; Grandin (2006) describes “new
imperialism” as the United States exerts so-called soft power into the 21st century after
two centuries of overt interventions through either direct or proxy force, militarily and
politically. It is true that the idea of imperialism is becoming more widely used in the
mainstream - from media outlets, to the political elite, to private citizens (Phillips 2011).
However, the application of this term tends to be in the negative – focused at old colonial
	
  

46

powers who are current economic powers – and ignores the new imperialist players, as
illustrated by Daniel Ortega’s selective interpretation of the concept of imperialism.
Cockcroft (2004), Grandin (2006) and others define neoliberal globalization as
imperialism, and Daniel Ortega – at least rhetorically – agrees with this definition. The
embrace of neoliberal economic policies by every US administration since Ronald
Reagan has become a pillar of international development strategy and a condition of
loans from international financial institutions, often with negative consequences for
receiving countries. Thus, neoliberalism is blamed as a harbinger of failed economic
policy pushed by the west, and ultimately viewed as another type of imperialism,
particularly among left-leaning Latin American countries in the 21st century. However,
Ortega fails to acknowledge that his more recent allies, Venezuela and China, have been
fully engaged in economic imperialism, and manipulate Nicaragua’s politics, economics,
and sovereign territory to varying degrees to meet their respective ends, just like the
United States.

There is a wide body of literature analyzing the resurgence of the left in Latin
America, dubbed 21st Century Socialism, the New Left, or the Pink Tide (Perla and CruzFeliciano 2013, Walker 2011, Wilm, 2011). There is also considerable discussion among
academics surrounding whether or not we have entered an era of “post- neoliberalism” or
“inclusive neoliberalism” (Yates and Bakker 2014; Petros Spanakos and Patoulas 2017;
Rucker 2009; Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington 2011). Calderon (2008) offers
political-economic ideologies that characterize the variations in post-neoliberalism in
Latin America. Notably, two of the four ideologies explicitly include “anti-imperialism”
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as a pillar. Yates and Bakker (2014) assert that these categories are not adequate
descriptors of post-neoliberalism in Latin America because they ignore existing social
formations and institutional dependency. Nonetheless, these ideologies focus on rhetoric
and policy and are therefore useful in encompassing the varying forms that the New Left
has transitioned towards from traditional neoliberal politics. Yates and Bakker mention
Nicaragua’s case only once in their analysis of post-neoliberalism, however Ettlinger and
Hartmann (2015) provide an exhaustive deconstruction of whether or not postneoliberalism is an appropriate description of the political economy of the new left in
Latin America, and use Nicaragua as a case study. They find that “contemporary
governance in Nicaragua is persistently neoliberal while entangling post-neoliberal with
liberal discourses and as well as the socialist adherence to the principle of equality”
(Ettlinger and Hartmann 2015). I argue that rhetoric matters immensely in the
characterization of the New Left, and their adoption of “post-neoliberalism,” particularly
in the case of Nicaragua, and Daniel Ortega’s selective interpretation of the concept of
imperialism. Ettlinger and Hartmann (2015) argue that the Ortega administration deploys
socialism and solidarity through redistribution programs that are largely discursive, and
are actually partisan and ineffective in reality. I argue that Ortega’s ability to fund such
programs – regardless of their robustness and accessibility – was funded directly by
Venezuela, with the express purpose mandated from Venezuela to bolster support for the
current Ortega administration. Ensuring Ortega’s continued reelection will further
Venezuela’s agenda to create a socialist trade bloc (ALBA) and serve as a counterbalance
to US hegemony in the region, therefore constituting a type of imperialism on behalf of
Venezuela. China does not come to Nicaragua with such explicit ideology, but rather is
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undeterred by the potential financial risks that such ideology might imply. China is
looking to expand its global economic power by controlling a trade route through the
Central American isthmus, and Nicaragua is looking for a financial backer after
Venezuelan funding ran out. The Ortega administration promotes the job creation and
economic growth promised by the canal. The Chinese have received a generous
concession to Nicaraguan sovereign territory and revenues from the canal and associated
projects. As national folk hero and father of the Nicaraguan resistance to US imperialism
Augusto Sandino stated, “Imperialism does not grow without a moral base of support
within the very populace in which it has its tentacles”(Gobat 2005, from
Belausteguigoitia 1933). Indeed, Daniel Ortega is cultivating imperialist practices from
his new allies as he manipulates his base to support his consecutive re-elections financed
by overt manipulation of Nicaragua’s politics, economics, and sovereign land by
Venezuela and China.

Phillips (2011) states that “Fundamentally, the language of imperialism has been
used to politicize debates about contemporary economy, society, and politics,” and
Daniel Ortega does exactly this through his specific brand of rhetoric. In fact, his overt
rejection of US imperialism and neoliberal practices forms the base of the political
platform that allowed him to return to power in 2007. As a former revolutionary leader of
the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de la Liberación Nacional), Ortega’s return after 16 years
out of power make Nicaragua a prime example of the resurgence of the New Left in Latin
America. He brought with him a mode of government that combines characteristics
described by Calderon (2008) including charismatic leadership, anti-imperialism, and a
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pragmatic relationship with the US. Interestingly, Ortega has managed to maintain a
reasonably amicable relationship with the US in trade and economic policy while
employing harsh rhetoric to denounce the US’s continued imperial practices. Tensions
between the US and Nicaragua are escalating as the US has become increasingly alarmed
at endemic corruption, a lack of free and fair elections, and minimal transparency from
the Ortega administration. In 2016 and 2017, the US introduced a bill called the
Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality (NICA) Act to pressure International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) to withhold funding until democratic norms are restored in Nicaragua.
Ortega denounced this as continued imperialism by the United States, as Nicaragua relies
heavily on funding from the neoliberal loan structures of IFIs such as the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ortega’s continued, vocal rejection of US
imperialism is simultaneous with his embrace of imperialist practices from Venezuela
and China. Since Ortega returned to power in 2007, both Venezuela and China have
become textbook imperialist players in Nicaragua – both working to expand political and
economic influence as well as direct territorial gains through oil pipelines and refineries,
and the Grand Canal project. Still, the US’s long history of intervention dominates
Ortega’s political rhetoric against imperialism and neoliberalism.

US Imperialism: Early Intervention

Nicaragua’s striking case study in US imperialism and intervention since the early
1800’s has been extremely well documented (Gobat, 2005; Walker, 2011; ).
Understanding Nicaragua’s political history and resistance to US imperialism helps to
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better explain the evolution of Sandinismo 2.0; also known as “Danielismo” and frame
Daniel Ortega’s leadership and popularity in Nicaragua. Western observers were
surprised when Daniel Ortega’s “revolutionary” and “leftist” FSLN party resumed power
in 2007 after 16 years of US-backed neoliberal leadership in Nicaragua. However, the
origins of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua can be traced back to the United States’
long history of intervention in the country. The United States’ first overt attempt at
intervention came when American fillibuster William Walker declared himself president
of Nicaragua in 1855. Popular resistance and a Central American army ultimately
defeated Walker, but the US returned in 1909 to overthrow liberal president Jose Zelaya,
replacing him with conservative Adolfo Diaz (Booth 1985). This marked the start of the
US’s military occupation and Nicaraguan banks, railroads, and customs office were given
to American bankers (Zimmerman 2000). In 1914, the Bryan-Chammoro treaty gave the
United States rights to build a canal across Nicaragua, and the never ratified CastilloKnox treaty effectively outlined US financial control over Nicaragua for decades to come
(Booth 1985). This effectively weakened the Nicaraguan government and intensified
fighting over US intervention in Nicaragua among liberal and conservative factions.

Sandino to Sandinismo 1.0

In 1927, in an effort to stem the tide of socialism, the US government brokered a
peace treaty between liberals and conservatives that kept the conservatives in power for
the time being, but allowed for liberal victory if free and fair elections were held in the
future. General Augusto Cesar Sandino was the only general who refused to sign the
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treaty, and he continued to battle the US marine occupation after all of the other liberal
generals had declared a truce. Sandino’s success gave him national hero status in
Nicaragua, and made the American military occupation increasingly unpopular in the US,
ultimately leading to the withdrawal of US troops in 1933 in light of the global economic
collapse. Anastasio Somoza Garcia was installed as head of the US trained Guardia
Nacional, and ordered Sandino’s assassination in 1934 – all seen as clear US
intervention. Somoza was able to wield his clout into a 46-year family-run dictatorship,
which was in power until 1979. The Cuban revolution ignited Nicaraguan opposition to
the Somoza regime and Carlos Fonseca started the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional), or FSLN in 1962. By the late 60s, Fonseca
was encouraging FSLN student groups to take up a clear Marxist ideology fueled by
Augusto Sandino’s revolutionary rhetoric and actions decades before, and to become
more revolutionary rather than sit idly watching the efforts of the FSLN in the field.
Carlos Fonseca was killed by a National Guard ambush in the mountains in 1976.
Humberto Ortega, Daniel Ortega, and Victor Tirado assumed control of the FSLN with a
more politically moderate, but militarily aggressive platform.

Protests against Somoza escalated in 1978 when conservative opposition leader
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was assassinated on his way to work. This time period of
Somoza’s repressive tactics also mobilized tens of thousands of young Nicaraguans to
join the FSLN, though the party had several divided factions. In March of 1979, the
FSLN officially reunified, helping the image that there were only two sides in the conflict
– the FSLN versus the Somoza regime, and the United States was unsurprisingly
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interested in making sure that the FSLN was not left with total control of the government.
On July 16, 1979 Somoza resigned and fled Nicaragua, and by July 19 the FSLN had
taken power. The FSLN conceded a role in the post-Somoza government where the
bourgeois opposition would be guaranteed a controlling role. The post revolutionary
government included Daniel Ortega, Moises Hassan, and Sergio Ramirez from the FSLN;
and Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro from the opposition. Robelo and Chamorro
were chosen because they identified with the Sandinista revolution, though Chamorro
held her position only briefly. Daniel Ortega was named Coordinator of the Junta of
National Reconstruction; then elected president and served from 1985 – 1990.

The Epitome of US Intervention

The United States was not pleased that the FSLN had taken power, and went to
extraordinary lengths to ensure that they didn’t remain in power by funding the Contras –
National Guard guerillas who fought a bloody war against the FSLN. This was one part
of a three-part campaign of interference by the US into Nicaragua’s politics and
economics under the Sandinistas. The US also laid heavy economic sanctions and
pressured IFIs to stop funding the Sandinista regime. Finally, the US pressured the FSLN
to hold “free and fair” elections in exchange for demobilizing the Contras and lifting the
embargo as part of a peace plan to stop the civil war. Chomsky (1993) asserts that the US
had no intention of stopping the war or lifting the embargo if the FSLN won the 1990
election.
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The FSLN indeed lost the election in 1990, but still retained 40% of the vote, and Ortega
recognized his defeat but promised to continue to fight on and govern from below. In
conceding the election, Ortega reminded the world that Nicaragua hoped to be
democratic and free of foreign intervention (i.e. US imperialism):
“I consider that in this historic moment, the principal contributions of the
Sandinistas, the Nicaraguan revolutionaries, are making to the Nicaraguan people
is that of guaranteeing a clean, pure electoral process, that it may heat up our
consciences even more, that it may shine with the sun of this dawn, the 26th of
February, in this 1990, that it may shine towards the consolidation of democracy,
the consolidation of a mixed economy, toward the consolidation of a free,
independent and democratic Nicaragua, in peace without intervention by any
foreign power where all of us Nicaraguans may be capable of demonstrating to
the world that we can change these dreams, these hopes, into reality. . . .” (Daniel
Ortega, via the New York Times, 2.27.1990)
The Height of Neoliberalism

The Chamorro administration also marked a period of aggressive neoliberal
economic policies, which ultimately had little success in improving the economy for
Nicaragua’s poorest citizens (Walker 2003). From 1990-2006, Nicaraguans continued to
elect right-wing candidates that pursued US-backed neoliberal policies and massive
conditional debt restructuring from IFIs such as the IMF and World Bank. The
conditionalities imposed by the terms of these loans, including decentralization, clear
property rights, and free trade policies, were viewed as another manifestation of US
imperial practices. During the Chamorro administration (1990 – 1996), the Sandinistas
used the time to reassert the party’s national identity as a revolutionary organization,
accomplishing this by staging violent, disruptive protests while making deals with the
government (Close and Marti i Puig 2012). Daniel Ortega continued to maintain his
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position at the table, observing the strengths and weaknesses of the conservative
government. He also witnessed Nicaragua’s increasing reliance on international financial
assistance from the US and IFIs through the broad expansion of neoliberalism via the
Washington Consensus. Arnaldo Alemán ruled from 1996 – 2001, and had been jailed
by the FSLN in the late 1980s, but he was able to find mutually beneficial ways to work
with Daniel Ortega. The first joint venture they undertook was settling a law that dealt
with real estate expropriated by the revolutionary government. The other issue they
addressed, which is still currently functioning, was the foundation of a political Pact to
ensure that the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) and the FSLN were the only two
political parties that would be in power. Much decision-making between elections was
made outside of formal institutions, via negotiations between Aleman and Ortega. The
Pact also strengthened the executive office (at the expense of accountability and other
branches of government) and turned other government agencies into party strongholds
(Close and Marti i Puig 2012).
“Furthermore, The pact was also a way to assure that congressional members of
both the ruling PLC and the opposition FSLN vote in favor of structuraladjustment measures and the enabling legislation for privatization that donors
made a virtual precondition for debt relief and reconstruction aid. In this sense,
the Alemán-Ortega pact is less a throwback to the old caudillo style of politics
than an indication of the scope of external intervention behind the scenes”
(Bendana 1999).
That Bendana refers to the phenomenon of “Danielismo” in 1999 as Ortega morphed
away from the original tenets of Sandinismo shows that this transition was a politically
expedient way to retain power since the FSLN’s loss in 1990, but well before he actually
won another presidential election in 2006. This also illustrates how Ortega has long been
very sensitive to the importance of IFI assistance to Nicaragua’s economic survival,
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regardless of how imperialistic or neoliberal the terms of loans, foreshadowing the advent
of Sandinismo 2.0.

Enrique Bolaños succeeded Alemán, serving from 2002 - 2007, and was able to
convict Aleman of over $100 million in fraud to the government. However, Bolaños was
increasingly at the mercy of Daniel Ortega, though Ortega’s power was limited to an
assembly seat. The FSLN was at first supportive of the Bolaños administration’s pursuit
of Aleman, but after pressure from the US, the president began to turn away from the
revolutionary party. The Aleman – Ortega Pact had provided for a candidate to be elected
president with 35 percent of the vote, allowing an Ortega victory when the two parties
divided into four, prior to the 2006 general elections (Close and Marti i Puig 2012). The
two new parties included the Sandinista Renewal Movement (Movimiento Renovador
Sandinista or MRS) on the left, and the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal
Nicaraguense or ALN) on the right. Both opposed the Aleman – Ortega Pact.

The Movimiento Renovador Sandinista movement (MRS) only received 6 percent
of the 2006 vote, but is still a visible force (Close and Marti i Puig 2012). A founding
member, Sergio Ramirez, was put forth as the MRS candidate in the 2008 election, but
Ortega’s FSLN party declared it illegal for the MRS to have a candidate in the election.
Wilm (2011) found that the MRS is mostly used as a party for Nicaraguans who still
identify with the FSLN, but do not like Daniel Ortega for various reasons. The MRS of
today does not seem to have a cohesive ideology; rather it can serve as a refuge for
Nicaraguans seeking an alternative from “Danielismo.” Indeed, Daniel Ortega has taken
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increasing credit for his role in the Sandinista revolution and is featured in an overly
prominent role in the Museum of the Sandinista Victory. His picture is displayed on
billboards across the country, alongside pictures of Sandino. In an LA Times interview,
Sergio Ramirez says that it is like all other contributors to the revolution have been
erased (Wilkinson 2010). It is common to hear Nicaraguans talk about Danielismo rather
than Sandinismo, due to the leader’s cult of personality and the fact that Ortega’s version
of Sandinismo has strayed from Carlos Fonseca’s original vision of a revolutionary
Nicaragua; thus giving way to Sandinismo 2.0.

Sandinismo 2.0

One of the more striking features of Sandinismo 2.0 is that it resembles the
authoritarian Somoza regime in many ways, the most notable of which is Ortega’s
continued revision of the national constitution to allow himself to be re-elected for
consecutive terms; ironic considering his 1990 concession speech where he addressed the
importance of “free and fair” elections. The 2016 elections saw Ortega win over 70
percent of the vote, primarily because the opposition party was not allowed to put forth a
candidate. It also gave the vice-presidency to Ortega’s wife, Rosario Murillo. As
Sandinismo 2.0 further evolves through Ortega’s consolidation of power among his
immediate family, he remains loyal to his socialist roots but aware of Nicaragua’s critical
need for IFI loans at favorable terms. This commitment hasn’t waivered throughout
Ortega’s tenure as president; even early on he finalized a ‘Poverty Reduction and Growth
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Facility’ agreement with the IMF in October of 2007, showing both sides’ willingness to
implement inclusive-neoliberal development policies (Ruckert 2008).

In 2016, the US Congress under President Barack Obama introduced the
“Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality (NICA) Act: To oppose loans at
international financial institutions for the Government of Nicaragua unless the
Government of Nicaragua is taking effective steps to hold free, fair, and
transparent elections, and for other purposes.”
This bill was re-introduced April 5, 2017 under the Trump administration and updated to
increase sanctions and include a more comprehensive outline of recent anti-democratic
actions taken by the Ortega administration to further undermine free and fair election
processes and democratic norms (Cerda 2017). Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo’s
official response to this bill is still fixated on the imperialist practices of the US, in April
2017, via a speech to ALBA countries in Havana, (from the ‘official’ translation by La
Voz de Sandinismo)
“The Government of Nicaragua, in this Fraternal Meeting of our Political
Council, reaffirms its categorical rejection and condemnation to the irrational and
unbalanced interventionist claim of a group of retrograde North American
Congressmen who persist in an evil and sinister desire to block our country
economically, by reintroducing the so called NICA-ACT. We will face this
perversity, advancing perseverant in Unity for the Common Good.”
In the official press release, Vice President Rosario Murillo stated
“The 2017 Nica Act is just another threat, another out of the many that it
has held over Nicaragua throughout history, in the imperialist mentality’s
eagerness to take over our country. It’s a new attempt to grant itself the right to
destructively intervene in our national affairs.” (Cerda 2017)

Venezuelan Imperialism
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Ortega’s reverence for IFI funding is even more critical since funding from his
primary ally – Venezuela – has been compromised in recent years. This is significant
because it is estimated that Nicaragua received over $4.4 billion dollars over nine years $500 million dollars per year, or 6% of Nicaragua’s GDP annually from Venezuela (de
Alba 2016). Much of this money remains unaccounted for; allegations that Ortega used it
as a private fund for personal projects abound (McCarthy 2011). This money financed
much of Ortega’s social initiatives including health care, roofing, and literacy campaigns.
This targeted assistance has garnered a strong political base of support for Ortega among
the very poor. This assistance was very strategic as Nicaragua’s allegiance with
Venezuela has been more than a monetary arrangement; rather Venezuela’s financial and
ideological support has allowed Daniel Ortega to stay in power for the last ten years.

Figure 2: Venezuelan Financial Support 2008-2013, from IMF Data.

Ortega quickly allied with Venezuelan-led ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of Our America) upon his return to power in 2007. ALBA was conceived as an
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alternative to the United States’ proposal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2003.
The FTAA was loathed by leftist leaders such as Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez who
condemned the proposal as another manifestation of US imperialism in Latin America.
Sandino himself often spoke of the “gran sueño de Bolivar” – Simon Bolivar’s dream of
a unified Latin America; a call that has been taken up by the leaders of the New Left,
including, Chavez and Ortega. ALBA is bankrolled by Venezuela’s oil coffers, the depths
of which wax and wane. Venezuela’s commitment to socialism and anti-imperialism do
not.
ALBA currently acts as an ideological and trade alliance between numerous leftleaning countries including Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador,
Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Venezuela. ALBA even developed its own virtual currency to more
easily facilitate economic integration among the block. Hugo Chavez’s charismatic
personality and massive oil coffers allowed Venezuela to be the de-facto leader of the
ALBA block. Ironically, Venezuela’s instrumental role in creating OPEC but subsequent
nationalization of the oil industry only served to legitimize imperialist practices of
multinational corporations rather than create the new international economic order that it
had been so “verbally militant” in promoting (Bye 1976). Venezuela remains a prominent
figure in the thriving ALBA bloc, even after the death of Chavez, falling oil prices, and
Venezuela’s current economic and social crisis.

Nicaragua signed another trade agreement to solidify its allegiance with ALBA
even after the death of Hugo Chavez (Rogers 2013). The agreement, known as
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ECOALBA-TCP, “the peoples trade treaty” is intended to promote more economic
integration, cooperation, and fair trade between ALBA countries. Tim Rogers of The
Nicaragua Dispatch explains,
“the text of the people’s trade treaty lists all the ways in which it will be different
from a regular free-trade agreement, which is considered capitalist and vile. The
ALBA pact will promote the strengthened role of the state, maintain
protectionism and promote economic sovereignty, the treaty promises.
ECOALBA-TCP also aims to promote the creation of state-run “grand-national
companies,” which are somehow supposed to be the opposite of transnational
companies in that they will put the people’s interests ahead of corporate profit—at
least in theory.”
In spite of this, Nicaragua continues to be an active participant in trade with the US under
CAFTA-DR.

Nicaragua was an original signatory of CAFTA-DR in 2005, which opened free
trade between the United States and Central American countries. Nicaragua joined
CAFTA-DR under the US-supported Bolaños administration. When Ortega returned to
power in 2007, he did not dissolve “neoliberal” arrangements such as CAFTA-DR. In
fact, he has continued to honor this trade agreement into 2017. Under it, he has expanded
free trade zones – particularly for textile manufacturing. These duty free zones dominated
by American-owned companies represent a literal territorial annex by the US’s
imperialist neoliberal policies, yet Ortega seems to be grateful for the positive press they
create. In a step incongruous with other Latin American regimes, Ortega instituted the
tripartite agreement, allowing labor unions to have an equal seat at the table with the
government and foreign investors. “The agreement also allows the Sandinistas to feel less
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guilty about promoting a free-market capitalist model because they can now point to their
efforts to ‘socialize’ labor conditions for the good of the working poor” (Rogers 2012).

He has also embraced the expansion of ProNicaragua, the official government
investment promotion agency, which paid off as the World Bank named ProNicaragua
the highest performing investment promotion agency in the world in 2012. Indeed,
Nicaragua has several laws in place to promote foreign direct investment in Nicaragua,
including a Tax Concertation Law (822); Temporary Admissions Law (382); Industrial
Free Zones for Export (917); Law on the Promotion of Renewable Electricity Generation
from Renewable Sources (532); Special Law on Exploration and Exploitation of Mines
(387); Incentives for the Tourism Industry Law (306); and Pensioners and Retirees Law
(694) (ProNicaragua 2017). All of these laws incentivize the exploitation of the
Nicaraguan labor market, natural resources, and land - ostensibly to promote job creation
and stimulate Nicaragua’s economic development by exempting these industries and
activities from paying various types of taxes. Ortega considered a strong tax base from
growing industry unnecessary given the steady funding coming from Venezuela. Taxes
on these legitimate industries from foreign individuals and corporations would also need
to be accounted for, unlike the funding coming from Venezuela.

The amount of funding from Venezuela, and the lack of transparency in managing
it, is staggering by most accounts. In 2011 and 2012, observers began to comment
on the extreme secrecy behind ALBA funding to ALBANISA, a private company
held by Ortega’s family and confidants, not subject to inclusion in the national
budget. The IMF took issue with this briefly in 2010 and refused to pay out the
balance of funds promised for a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility project in
Nicaragua (McCarthy 2011). “ALBA is secretive by design. No Venezuelan
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money passes through Nicaragua’s state coffers or any other auditable channels
subject to third-party oversight or regulation. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and Nicaragua’s increasingly feckless opposition have repeatedly implored
the Ortega government to open the books on ALBANISA, but they say the most
anyone has gotten is a peepshow glimpse that leaves most of the details to the
imagination. What’s known, from a superficial report the central bank provided
begrudgingly at the repeated behest of the IMF, is 80 percent of the $2.2 billion
reported through 2011 is registered as loans and concessionary oil credits that
need to be repaid within the next 25 years.” (Tim Rogers, 2012).
In 2017, reports are even more scathing with Mariano de Alba of la Confidencial
explaining how Venezuelan interference in Nicaragua has severely undermined the rule
of law while allowing access to IFI financing. Venezuelan funding has allowed Ortega to
consolidate his authoritarian regime, control media and public figures; and weaken the
rule of law to silence the opposition. Support from Venezuela has allowed Nicaragua to
bypass development assistance from the United Nations, the European Union and the
United States while creating the financial stability to access IDI funding. It has further
allowed Nicaragua to finance social programs to bolster support for the FSLN and
citizens’ dependency on the state; all without the burden of transparency or accountability
(de Alba 2017). These social programs include transportation subsidies for busses and
taxis, agricultural loans, microcredit, zinc roofing and property titles to the poor,
educational scholarships, and bonuses for state employees (Rogers 2012). ALBA’s
promises include literal territorial takeovers, including an oil pipeline from the Atlantic to
the Pacific, a massive oil refinery on the pacific, and seven thermal power stations fueled
by Venezuelan bunker fuel, aptly named Che Guevara I – IX and Hugo Chavez.
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Nonetheless, ALBA funding has helped Nicaragua overcome some of the less
desirable effects of neoliberal policy – for example the massive rate increases to
consumers under electricity privatization, a standard condition of World Bank and IMF
loans.
“It is unfortunate that such a delicate political decision should be the outcome of a
fundamentally undemocratic process of external imposition of conditionalities,
particularly given the current environment in which partnerships and country
ownership are touted as a cornerstone of the development regime” (Ruckert
2009).
This underscores how Nicaragua is part of a number of complex and interdependent trade
regimes to promote its national interests. The regional electricity market is part of a
neoliberal development initiative supported by the United States and IFIs to enable open
energy trade among Central American countries. After electricity privatization, service
was not more reliable either and blackouts remain common, as much of Nicaragua’s
energy infrastructure is sub-standard and poorly maintained. Because the private
operators did not fairly price electric service they were not able to invest in improved
infrastructure. Also, Nicaragua’s political system has traditionally favored more
socialized institutions, so the population is used to having the government provide basic
services rather than a private supplier. Tim Rogers of The Nicaragua Dispatch reported a
7.78% rate increase in April 2013, after privatization. However, ALBA-CARUNA, a
Sandinista cooperative that manages Venezuelan aid provided a $35 million subsidy to
mitigate the effects of the rate hike, which would otherwise be 15% (Rogers 2013). David
Castillo, president of INE, said that 82% of the population, or roughly 630,000 lowincome households, consumes less than 150 kilowatt-hours and will be covered by the
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subsidy (Rogers 2013). Consumers who use less than 150 kWh won’t be impacted by the
rate hike. Nicaragua already has the highest electricity rates in Central America.

“The irony of it all is that it was the Venezuelan government, the recurring
defender of the principle that a country’s domestic affairs shouldn’t be meddled
with, which has been the one to put the exact opposite into practice. The reality is
that Venezuela has strengthened a political leader (Ortega) and his party (FSLN)
with so many resources that it has eliminated the chance for democracy to be
exercised.” (De Alba 2017).
Nonetheless, even Bayardo Arce, President Ortega’s top economic adviser, said that the
government was working to diversify its economic relations with China, Europe and the
United States because “We have to anticipate that ALBA is not going to be permanent.”
(Rogers 2012).

The “Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century”

Nicaragua has certainly diversified its allegiances for financial and ideological
support, from one imperialist power to the next. The intent of a trans-oceanic canal has
been a hallmark of foreign intervention in Nicaragua for centuries. However now, rather
than a US controlled canal, Ortega has ceded rights to the Chinese. Thomas Jefferson first
broached the desire for a canal through Nicaragua in 1788, marking the earliest
imperialist leanings of the US in Nicaragua (Gobat 2005). However, the US did not
attempt to actually construct the canal until the late 1800s when surveys began, ultimately
abandoning the project for a more suitable route in Panama. The canal project of the late
1800s enjoyed popular support as Nicaraguans hoped it would aid the country’s
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development. Today’s canal project is no different, as canal supporters hope that it will
bring much needed jobs and infrastructure to Nicaragua. Critics point to a lack of
transparency in the contractual arrangement between HKND and the Nicaraguan
Government. China has become a global power and intends to fundamentally alter global
trade routes for its massive export industry. A canal through Nicaragua, regardless of
who builds it, means an imperial power controls physical territory.

In remarks at the groundbreaking ceremony for the Grand Canal, HKND
Chairman Wang Jing referred to the Grand Canal as the “Maritime Silk Road of the 21st
Century” which “will definitely change the pattern of global maritime trade.” Wang Jing
is clearly aware of the history of the canal, the scale of the project, and the global
speculation against it ever being built. He states
“When we talk about the Grand Canal of Nicaragua, it always reminds us the
century-old dream shared by many people in history, which of course rest with the
thick blueprints and papers. Until today, this dream of over a hundred years has
gone through the time channel echoing the roaring of trucks and heavy
machineries now in front of us. People cannot help wondering whether the dream
comes true in this century. If so, what we will get and what we will lose? How
that a dream wasn't realized for so many generations, will become a reality today?
In fact, during the last two years, we have encountered challenges in all aspects.
Being regarded as the largest infrastructure project of the human history is not
only simply meant to the huge amounts of excavations through the mountains,
constructions of roads and bridges overwater. In more than two years, the doubts
and speculations on the Canal Project about protection of the environment,
resettlement, technology, machinery, finance, law, politics, experience,
equipment, etc. never stopped. Today we proudly announce that we have
overcome all those challenges. With the full support of President of Nicaragua
and relevant government departments, and with the concerted efforts of worldclass companies and scientists from countries like the US, UK, Belgium, Australia
and China, and esp. with the overall understanding recognition and support of
Nicaraguans, we have made the milestone commencement with full confidence.”
(HKND 2014).
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Wang Jing provides further assurances that the canal project will be fair and equitable:
“I’d like to express that Chinese companies and Chinese have arrived at this
beautiful country to build it and not to destroy or damage it. We vow to respect all
the rights and interests of the Nicaraguan people. The resettlement work will be
based on the principles of being equitable, fair, public and transparent. Without
the consent of the owners, or the satisfaction with the compensation, not a single
plant on their land will be touched.”
Finally, Jing closes with a list of things that China has promised Nicaragua for 2015
including sending 50 Nicaraguan students to university in China, giving Nicaragua a new
fleet of ambulances and fire trucks, and renovating hospitals. “It is the best wish of all
HKND staff that the life of Nicaraguans could get better every day. We will intensify our
efforts to fulfill the responsibilities of social welfare, because we are a family.”

Unsurprisingly, this massive infrastructure project is overwhelmed with
speculation by critics and doubters as to whether it will ever be completed (much less
started on any significant level). There is a great deal of criticisms surrounding the
environmental and human costs of the canal, with some estimates stating that over
100,000 people and 1 million hectares of land will be displaced. Official estimates from
HKND differ, and critics also point to inadequate environmental impact and basic
feasibility studies. Another main concern is that Daniel Ortega sold Nicaragua’s
sovereignty to China at an extremely discounted rate. The canal issue can be divided
down party lines, in many cases. However, in an extensive report on the Nicaraguan
Canal for The New Yorker, journalist Jon Lee Anderson interviewed former Contra leader
Eden Pastora who stated
‘“The opposition calls it a surrendering of national sovereignty, but investors need
security for their investment. And not a single foreign soldier is coming to
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Nicaragua! What really bothers them is the prestige that this signifies for Daniel
Ortega. Keep in mind: this will change the economy of the world. The natural
resources won’t have to go around Cape Horn anymore, but come straight through
here to China, on megaships!’ Pastora went on, ‘There will be two-hundred-ton
trucks doing earthmoving and specialized drivers earning a thousand dollars a
day! The ticos are just concerned that we’re going to be the richest people in
Central America.’ He cackled. ‘There are going to be railroads, refineries,
satellites, hydroelectric plants, airports, and over thirty-seven social projects—all
of it achieved in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy, without even so much
as a tear-gas cannister fired, without persecuting anybody. In five years, Managua
will be a canal city, the most beautiful of Central America.’ Carried away by his
vision, he shouted, ‘Viva Daniel Ortega!”’(Anderson 2014).
Opposition to the canal is being silenced by the Ortega administration. Acclaimed
writer, poet, and former FSLN activist Gioconda Belli (2017) states
“It’s predictable that the repression we’re already seeing will worsen, as was
evident in the last march organized by the rural anti-canal movement. As in the
eighties, the Ortega apparatus and their well-tuned propaganda machine will
appeal to the Nicaraguan people’s true and historic anti-imperialism, using it like
a machete to cut down and vilify anyone opposed to sovereignty: not the
sovereignty of the country – in any case, that’s already been sold to Wang Jing –
but that of the pseudo-monarchy that rules us.”
China is undoubtedly an imperialist power in the 21st century (Taylor 2011). With
a population of over 1.3 billion and an exponentially growing economy, China is
unsurprisingly trying to access additional resources through investments in extractive
industries, industrial farmland, and energy sources. China has found mutually beneficial
ways to work with “semipariah states that Western democracies remain wary of” – and
these countries are happy to engage, “since securing similar funds from Western powers
normally entails tiresome assurances on human rights and transparency — topics Beijing
is only too happy to disregard.” (Cheng 2013). As Nicaragua is once again out of the
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US’s good graces because of a lack of transparency, accountability, and democratic
norms, a financial ally who overlooks these transgressions is welcome.

Conclusion

Rhetorically, Sandinismo 2.0 is very much the same as the original tenets of
Sandinismo as Ortega continues to vocally denounce US imperialism in Nicaragua. It
differs in that Ortega openly welcomes neoliberal loan conditions from IFIs, and direct
political, economic, and territorial intervention from new allies Venezuela and China.
Ortega is opportunistic, strategic, and bold as he crafts his empire, showing his base of
support tangible benefits while consolidating power among his immediate family and
confidantes and silencing the voice of the opposition. US imperialism is still alive and
well in Nicaragua, only now it is invited by Ortega in forms that compliment the agendas
of the new imperialist powers that have placed their tentacles in Nicaragua. Venezuela
and China are interested in Nicaragua not only as an ideological ally, but also as a
strategic territorial position from which to expand their respective oil and global trade
empires. Ortega’s supporters have reason to embrace his social policies and subsidies, as
Nicaragua remains one of the poorest countries in Latin America. His opponents have
reason to decry the increasingly authoritarian leanings of the government, as their voices
have been silenced while Ortega develops his own personal empire with the help of
strategic allies.
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CHAPTER 4 – THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN
NICARAGUA

It is increasingly evident that countries in all stages of development are
scrambling to incorporate major infrastructure – from energy to water to transportation to
telecommunications – so that they may better compete in today’s globalized world. These
megaprojects are conceived to benefit large sectors of the population, require significant
financial and human resources, produce complex and technologically advanced systems,
and may change their surrounding economic, social, organizational, and natural
environments (Flyvbjerg 2003).

With a population of only about six million covering 50,000 square miles, and the
dubious honor of being the poorest country in Central America, Nicaragua is not the most
likely host for a plethora of megaprojects. However, political and economic motivations
have conspired with geographic advantages to allow Nicaragua to conceptualize a wide
variety of megaprojects, including a trans-isthmus canal, a regional space satellite, and
major green energy infrastructure. While some of these projects have been realized
(particularly regarding renewable energy), others remain in the planning stages.
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Many complex political and economic factors contribute to the success or failure
to implement Nicaraguan megaprojects. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of
Nicaragua’s renewable energy initiative. In 2012, Nicaragua was widely publicizing its
goal of generating over 90% renewable energy by 2017 (ProNicaragua 2012). In 2016,
Nicaragua had reached 47% renewables generation and refined its target to 73% by 2036
(Climatescope 2017). This is a noble goal for a country that was 75% reliant on imported
oil for electricity, compared to 43% on average for Central America in the early 2000’s
(CEPAL 2007). Nicaragua has geographic resources in the form of abundant wind,
geothermal, and hydroelectric resources to meet its ambitious renewable energy goal.
International investors and the neoliberal agendas of international institutions such as the
World Bank and InterAmerican Development Bank have jumped on the opportunity to
promote renewable energy development. While Nicaragua touts its impressive wind and
geothermal energy resources, the majority of its renewable energy potential comes from
hydroelectricity. However, Nicaragua’s deep ideological and financial ties with
Venezuelan socialism and oil resources have complicated its path to renewable energy
generation. These conflicting ideologies make it difficult to parse out exactly which
model – neoliberalism or socialism – has driven Nicaragua’s emerging energy landscape.
Therefore, this study seeks to better understand the political economy of energy
development in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua’s Energy Development Paradigm
Nicaragua’s national development policy is driven by a paradox of political
economy considerations. Neoliberal development driven by US interests and international
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financial institutions (IFI) competed with Venezuelan socialism via promulgation of the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) when high oil prices
between 2007 – 2012 allowed Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez to spread socialism
through generous financial subsidies, thus creating a dynamic ideological, economic, and
political scene in Nicaragua. Nowhere is this conflict more evident than Nicaragua’s
complicated energy development paradigm. Nicaragua is simultaneously pursuing
aggressive fossil fuel and renewable energy infrastructure, including regional and
national transmission lines; wind, geothermal, and hydroelectric power plants; offshore
oil and gas exploration; and oil refining and exporting facilities. While many countries
(the United States included) promote a mix of both traditional and renewable energy
resources, the mix of neoliberal and socialist rhetoric and politics surrounding
Nicaragua’s current energy development policy makes it a unique case study.

Nicaragua can easily develop renewable energy as its primary source of power
since it has the geographic advantage of plentiful geothermal, wind, and hydropower
resources, and has been eager to do so, per its well-publicized goal of reaching over 90%
renewable energy generation. If Nicaragua achieves its goal of becoming 90% renewable,
it will rise to the ranks of other renewable energy leaders in the region such as Brazil and
Paraguay. This is a great feat for any country, particularly a less developed country
(LDC) riddled with political and economic challenges, such as Nicaragua. This
renewable energy effort provides an example to other LDCs on how to avoid the mistakes
of developed countries, and prioritize clean energy solutions. Nicaragua was only
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exploiting about 6% of its renewable energy potential in 2012, and still depends on
imported oil in 2018 to meet the majority of its energy needs.

International financial institutions such as the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Development Bank have provided massive financial
incentives for Nicaragua to invest in renewable energy via neoliberal development
mechanisms such as structural adjustments, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
and REDD+. Nicaragua has also revised investment regulations to promote foreign
direct investment in both renewable and fossil fuel energy (ProNicaragua 2012). US
companies are involved in geothermal power plants and offshore oil exploration in
Nicaragua (Hoyt 2011 and Castro 2009). Nicaragua has also increased national
electrification rates in spite of privatization challenges and a weak local market for
electricity (ProNicaragua 2012). Nicaragua has one of the lowest electrification rates and
the highest reliance on foreign oil imports for energy in Central America (CEPAL 2007).
The existing energy infrastructure is inadequate to meet demand, and does not operate at
capacity. If Nicaragua were to drastically increase its renewable energy generation,
inadequate infrastructure, prohibitive distribution regulations and unaffordable electricity
rates would prevent this energy from reaching the market, both within and outside of
Nicaragua.

Nicaragua’s pledge to drastically increase its renewable energy production came
in spite of the relative comfort Nicaragua enjoyed from the discounted fuel oil provided
by Venezuela at a time when Nicaragua was 90% reliant on fuel oil to meet its energy
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needs (Rogers 2013). During this time, Venezuela provided Nicaragua over $4.4 billion
dollars over nine years - $500 million dollars per year, or 6% of Nicaragua’s GDP
annually from Venezuela (de Alba 2016). Venezuela also built Nicaragua seven thermal
power stations fueled by Venezuelan bunker fuel, named Che Guevara I – IX and Hugo
Chavez.

Figure 3: Thermal power plants funded by Venezuela.
http://www.mem.gob.ni/media/file/POLITICAS%20Y%20PLANIFICACION/Anuario%20Estadistico%20El
ectrico%202013%20(29%2007%2014).pdf

Because Nicaragua had one of the highest dependencies on imported oil and
lowest rates of electrification in Central America, it should have been able to promote
renewable energy development without the complications of existing economic
structures, fossil fuel infrastructure or national oil lobbies. This was true to a certain
extent, except for the complication of Nicaragua’s deep economic and ideological
association with ALBA. Venezuela used its geographic advantage as the most significant
oil-producing state in Latin America to promote a regional alliance as an alternative to
US hegemony in the region. Venezuela provided Nicaragua cheap oil, electricity
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subsidies, and infrastructure projects in exchange for access to the Pacific coast to
attempt to more easily export oil to China and an ideological allegiance of leftist regimes.

All of Nicaragua’s energy development initiatives seem well and good, but the
motivations for pursuing such an aggressive renewables initiative remain cloudy. The
drivers behind Nicaragua’s energy investments hold a number of paradoxes. In a matter
of five years (2012 – 2017), Nicaragua hoped to go from having the lowest regional rates
of electrification to the highest; from the highest rates of foreign oil import dependency to
the highest rates of renewable energy generation. Energy policy rhetoric emphasized
clean energy and rural electrification, but did little to address Nicaragua’s dependence on
wood fuel as a primary energy source. Foreign investors and donor agencies have
continued to revoke funding in light of the increasingly authoritarian Ortega
administration; yet the Nicaraguan government continued to pass regulatory legislation to
promote international investment in its energy sector. Furthermore, Nicaragua touts clean
energy development with its goal of having over 90% of its electricity generation come
from renewables by in the future; while the Ortega administration relied heavily on
economic ties with Venezuelan oil subsidies to sustain and develop Nicaragua’s energy
resources such as power plants and adequate energy to meet demand.

In light of these paradoxes, it is important to better understand the political and
economic drivers motivating Nicaragua’s energy development. Perla and Cruz-Feliciano
(2013) offer a theory explaining the apparent contradictions in policies and rhetoric
versus realized actions. They explain that from a political standpoint, the domestic
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opposition confuses the Sandinista party’s tactical decisions with their more strategic
objectives. Also, critics from the left feel that the party’s revolutionary roots should be
more political than social. Instead, they claim that the new version of socialism currently
playing out in Nicaragua is best seen as a risk-adverse approach, where a progressive
stage of capitalism is necessary to transition fully to socialism by maintaining positive
relationships with the United States and local elites while diversifying regional and
international financial support in order to maintain social reforms. Perla and CruzFeliciano cite Nicaragua’s participation in the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR), criminalization of abortion, and reservations about international
observation of elections as examples of where this contradiction is most visible. While
the authors reference several energy initiatives funded by Venezuela in Nicaragua, they
never directly identify energy development as an example of the apparent ideological
conflict between the Sandinista’s neoliberal and socialist policies. Therefore, it is prudent
to further investigate the driving political economies behind Nicaragua’s energy sector.

Methods

Discourse analysis is particularly appropriate as a tool to analyze Nicaragua’s USVenezuela-China paradox, as neoliberalism and socialism use very different but equally
prominent language and keywords. For example, Venezuela’s state-run oil company,
Petroleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA) features all of Venezuela’s energy unions on its
website. Discourse analysis of PDVSA’s explanation for the ALBA union sheds insight
into Nicaragua’s current development ideology. An excerpt of the strong language from
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Venezuela’s explanation of ALBA clearly differs from the way the US would
characterize its intent for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA):
“The ALBA integration initiative challenges the neoliberal North American Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), introduced by the US at the 1st Summit of
the Americas, held in 1994. If approved, FTAA would imply, from the political
standpoint, the division of the Latin American countries and unprecedented levels
of dependence and subordination. Economically, it would lead to the
denationalization of the economies and to the intensification of Neoliberalism,
and socially it would bring more poverty and desperation to the majority of the
population in our countries” (PDVSA 2005).
By comparing official language surrounding the ALBA agreement and the agreement
itself with the same from the FTAA and CAFTA-DR, Nicaragua’s dueling ideologies
become clear.

Nicaragua has a complicated set of national energy development priorities
motivated by a variety of political and economic factors. Nicaragua can easily develop
renewable energy as its primary source of power since it has the geographic advantage of
plentiful geothermal, wind, and hydropower resources. It was also desperately trying to
increase national electrification rates in spite of privatization challenges and questions as
to whether end-use for electricity, via transnational sales or individual local users, is even
viable. Because Nicaragua had one of the highest dependencies on imported oil and
lowest rates of electrification in Central America, it should have been able to embrace
neoliberal renewable energy development incentives without the complications of
existing economic structures, fossil fuel infrastructure or national oil lobbies. This was
true to a certain extent, except for Nicaragua’s deep economic and ideological association
with the Venezuela-driven Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA
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for its acronym in Spanish). Venezuela used its geographic advantage as the most
significant oil-producing state in Latin America to promote a regional alliance as an
alternative to US hegemony in the region. Venezuela provided Nicaragua cheap oil,
electricity rate subsidies, and infrastructure projects in exchange for access to the Pacific
coast and an ideological allegiance to leftist regimes. Still, Ortega simultaneously
embraced neoliberal funding for renewable energy promotion to address its energy and
electrification deficit. This study examines the neoliberal and socialist aspects of
Nicaragua’s energy development initiatives to better understand the resultant energy
landscape. To do so, this research first explores the essential nature of energy to a
country’s development; it then investigates the financial incentives available for
renewable energy projects, as well as Nicaragua’s energy situation. Next this research
discussed the role of Venezuela in financing Nicaraguan energy via fuel oil in light of
electrification challenges and Nicaragua’s renewables initiative. Finally, it concludes
with a discussion of political economy’s perspective on Nicaragua’s energy paradoxes.

Energy as a Development Priority

Energy is a political, economic, and environmental issue. The three are
inextricably linked. In light of recent global economic instability and increasing demand
for energy resources, energy remains an important topic in both developed and
developing countries. Many small, less-developed countries suffer from energy poverty
and are highly dependent on outside assistance to meet their energy needs. A variety of
different economic interests play a vital role in promoting energy in developing countries.
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OPEC is obviously hugely influential in oil dependent nations around the globe.
However, renewable energy corporations are increasingly able to access smaller markets
once unreachable due to economic and political barriers.

Because energy development is such a pressing topic, international development
assistance for energy projects continues to make up a large percentage of programmatic
budgets. In 2006, official development assistance for energy was calculated at $4.9
billion dollars globally (Sanchez, 2010). This number is higher because it includes fossil
fuel exploration and excludes expenses from programs with multiple components besides
energy development. Access to energy is a major priority in helping developing countries
meet the Millennium Development Goals, as championed by neoliberal development
proponent Jeffrey Sachs. Furthermore, energy security remains a prominent factor in
international and domestic policies because of fluctuating oil prices, climate change, and
general national security concerns. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to
these challenges. Karl Zimmerer (2011) reminds us that “energy is far and away the most
significant international resource system and political economic nexus.”

While reducing energy poverty in developing nations indeed means increased
energy consumption, it is at a very small scale on the individual level. Teodoro Sanchez
claims “the increase in modern energy consumption necessary to enable poor people in
developing countries to escape poverty would not have a significant impact on global
emissions” (Sanchez 2010). Even if individual use is low, the sheer number of energy
consumers requires that developing countries integrate substantial renewable energy
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sources into their fuel mix. Regardless, increased energy access to impoverished people
at a household level coupled with growing industry has clear environmental impacts,
particularly related to climate change. The challenge lies when billions of impoverished
people gain access to energy, as in the case of India and China, who have become global
energy consumption pariahs. Indeed, BRICS countries (and others with energy resources,
such as Venezuela) have become involved in energy investments in less developed
countries (LDCs) as globalization enables people around the world to strive for access to
energy.

Financial Incentives for Renewables

A variety of international policy initiatives such as the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), REDD+, and Cap-and-Trade schemes have emerged to address
global climate change from increased energy consumption. The CDM and REDD+
encourage economic growth while promoting environmentally sustainable energy
development and conservation. All of these clean energy schemes have clear political
motivations. The IMF, World Bank, and other international financial institutions (IFIs)
use these mechanisms to facilitate neoliberal development initiatives in less developed
countries (LDCs). Often, LDCs uses these financial incentives as one piece of a much
larger paradigm of national energy development. For example, Nicaragua has developed
geothermal and wind capacity under the CDM and embraced loans from the Inter
American Development Bank to finance electrification improvements.
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Official development assistance for developing countries is almost always
targeted at economic growth, per the neoliberal development model. This is why the vast
majority of energy assistance has been in the form of large-scale infrastructure projects
such as coal, hydro, transmission lines, oil pipelines, refineries, and power grids. Much of
this infrastructure also enables energy exports to both developing and industrialized
countries. Because energy is inherently political, clean development initiatives can be
used as a political play to maintain alliances with certain groups, such as IFIs and
neoliberal donors, while simultaneously entertaining investments and involvement from
global players outside of the neoliberal agenda. This is illustrated by involvement from
global energy players such as Venezuela in countries like Nicaragua that are seemingly
insignificant on the global energy scene.

Nicaragua’s Energy Reality

Another reason Nicaragua is open to all types of financial assistance is because it
has the dubious honor of being the second-poorest country in the Western Hemisphere
(state.gov 2018). It has also boasted the lowest rates of electrification and the highest
dependency on imported oil in Latin America. Many argue that these statistics are a clear
indication of the failure of neoliberal development principles (Muhr 2009 and Wilm
2012). Indeed, the election of Daniel Ortega and the re-emergence of the leftist
Sandinista party in 2007 suggested an ideological shift from previous Nicaraguan
administrations embrace of neoliberalism, US regional hegemony, and the globalized
economy.
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Per The Economic Commission for Latin America’s (CEPAL, for its acronym in
Spanish) statistics, Nicaragua had only 55% total electrification, while the rest of Central
America averaged 92% electrification in 2007. Similarly, Nicaragua was 75% dependent
on foreign oil imports for its national energy needs while other Central American
countries average 43% dependency in the early 2000’s. For example, as of 2009,
Nicaragua’s installed electric capacity was less than half of neighboring Costa Rica, and
significantly less than El Salvador, which has roughly the same population but is onesixth of the land size (Witte-Lebhar 2011). It is important to note that energy from
electricity makes up only half of Nicaragua’s energy demand, as the country also relies
on wood fuel for the other half of its energy needs, primarily for cooking (McCrary et al,
2005). Still, electricity is an essential component for economic development and
Nicaragua has taken a wide variety of steps to try to combat its energy shortage.
Venezuela’s support through cheap oil was essential in offsetting this massive deficit.
The country has also undergone region-wide grid integration, which enables Central
America to physically trade electricity between countries on market-based principles, and
Nicaragua is eager to trade electricity on this open market, whether it comes from
Venezuelan-supplied fuel oil or neoliberal-funded renewable projects. Ortega accepted a
massive loan from the IDB to fund national electrification and has managed to raise 1.5
billion dollars in private investment for renewable energy projects due to tax incentives.

Venezuelan Financial Incentives
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The idea of a regional electricity market highlights how Nicaragua is part of a
number of complex and interdependent trade regimes to promote its national interests.
Interestingly, (and in addition to the allegiance with ALBA) the regional electricity
market is part of a neoliberal development initiative supported by the United States and
international financial institutions enable open energy trade among Central American
countries. Nicaragua was an original signatory of CAFTA-DR in 2005, which opened
free trade between the United States and Central American countries. Nicaragua joined
CAFTA-DR under the US-supported Bolaños administration. However, when the leftist
Sandanista party came into power in the 2006 elections, Daniel Ortega quickly allied with
ALBA, which was conceived as an alternative to the United States’ proposal of a Free
Trade Area of the Americas in 2003. ALBA currently acts as a trade alliance between
ideological allies including Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador,
Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines and Venezuela. ALBA has even developed its own virtual currency to more
easily facilitate economic integration among the block.

For example, Venezuela had attempted to build a large oil refinery known as the
“Supreme Dream of Bolivar” on the northwestern coast of Nicaragua since Ortega
returned to power in 2007. Were this project completed
“Nicaragua will have a total fuel-storage capacity of nearly 1 billion barrels of
diesel, gasoline and fuel oil, according to government plans. Not only will
Nicaragua be able to supply China and its own domestic needs, where gas pump
prices are the highest in the region, but also supply 40 percent of Central
America’s oil needs” (Rogers 2010).
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Hugo Chavez and Daniel Ortega made a dramatic public display for the groundbreaking
ceremony in 2007, with Chavez declaring that Nicaragua “would not have to import even
one gallon of gasoline” (Navarro 2015). This ambitious project would cost an estimated
$6.6 billion dollars, funded through Nicaragua’s ALBANISA fund – a huge bank account
provided by Venezuela for major infrastructure projects. Rogers describes ALBANISA
as “a mixed Venezuelan-Nicaraguan joint venture that is managed like Ortega’s private
business.” Not even ten percent of the earmarked funding has been spent on the project,
which currently acts as a storage facility but does not yet refine oil (Navarro 2015).
Nonetheless, the Nicaraguan government signed an agreement at the end of 2012 to not
only complete the “Supreme Dream of Bolivar” refinery project, but also to construct an
oil pipeline across the Nicaragua, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Like most other
ALBA-funded projects, many people were skeptical that this will ever come to fruition
(Rogers 2013). As of 2016, after the price of oil dropped, and Venezuela’s economy
collapsed, Nicaragua was seeking alternate investors in the refinery. Perhaps this is one
reason why the Nicaraguan government has been actively promoting renewable
electricity development on a large scale. In fact, Nicaragua attracted over 1.5 billion USD
in clean energy investments between 2006 – 2012 (IRENA 2015).

Nicaragua signed another trade agreement to solidify its allegiance with ALBA
even after the death of Hugo Chavez (Rogers 2013). The agreement, known as
ECOALBA-TCP, “the peoples trade treaty” is supposed to promote more economic
integration, cooperation, and fair trade between ALBA countries. Tim Rogers of The
Nicaragua Dispatch explains,
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“the text of the people’s trade treaty lists all the ways in which it will be different
from a regular free-trade agreement, which is considered capitalist and vile. The
ALBA pact will promote the strengthened role of the state, maintain
protectionism and promote economic sovereignty, the treaty promises.
ECOALBA-TCP also aims to promote the creation of state-run ‘grand-national
companies,’ which are somehow supposed to be the opposite of transnational
companies in that they will put the people’s interests ahead of corporate profit—at
least in theory.”
In spite of this, Nicaragua continues to be an active participant in trade with the US under
CAFTA-DR.

Regional Electricity Integration

Trade agreements of any type are irrelevant for Nicaragua if it can’t physically
transfer energy outside of its national boundaries. The ability to buy and sell electricity in
the market was a critical component of Nicaragua’s motivation to increase energy
generation and national electrification. Trading energy inherently requires large
infrastructure in the form of a regional transmission line, rather than traditional freightbased trade, easily facilitated through roads, air or sea. The Central American Electrical
Interconnection System, (SIEPAC for its acronym in Spanish) is a new transmission line
that links Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama to one
regional electricity transmission grid. This uniform system has a high capacity that allows
these countries to trade electricity across borders; and effectively creates a new electricity
market (Hoyt, 2011). Expected benefits of this system include decreased power outages,
more efficient use of hydroelectric resources, and decreased operating costs. International
financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Central
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American Bank for Economic Integration are the primary funders of SIEPAC (IDB
2012). Other donors such as USAID are supporting renewable energy integration into the
project (Hoyt 2011). In order to be successful, the project needs increased capacity and
regulatory cooperation on a regional level, which further emphasizes the complexity of
Nicaragua’s energy situation. Nicaragua also needs to significantly increase its electricity
production in order to be able to participate in the financial incentives provided by this
new market.

Nicaragua’s Renewables Initiative

In light of burgeoning demand, opportunities provided by the SIEPAC
integration, and geographic potential, Nicaragua pledged to drastically increase its
renewable energy production in spite of the relative comfort Nicaragua enjoyed from the
steady oil supply provided by Venezuela. ProNicaragua, the country’s official investment
agency, states that Nicaragua has a potential of 4,500 megawatts of production capacity
from renewable sources such as geothermal, wind, hydroelectric, solar, and biomass – but
only a small percentage of this had been exploited. While the exact date continues to be
revised, the official message from Nicaragua is that it intends to become 90% renewable
in the relatively near future. In August 2010, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega
launched the Plan de Expansión de la Generación Eléctrica 2010-2017, which attempted
to increase Nicaragua’s electricity generation capacity by 70%, allowing Nicaragua to
actively participate in SIEPAC electricity transmission.
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Furthermore, Witte-Lebhar states that the Ortega administration simultaneously
implemented a program that focuses on renewable energy projects as well as rural
electrification. The National Program for Sustainable Electrification and Renewable
Energy (Spanish Acronym is PNESER) promised to expand rural electrification to
117,000 new households via small-scale electricity generation projects and rural
transmission lines. The program hopes to expand electricity coverage to 85% of the
population (Witte-Lebhar 2011). This effort was largely successful and as of 2018,
Nicaragua was able to increase electrification to reach 90% of the population. The InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) provided Nicaragua with a $30.5 million loan to
support this project. However, as President Ortega takes increasingly leftist alliances, the
stability of major investments in Nicaragua, both public and private, comes into question.
In spite of this, the Nicaraguan government has gone to great lengths to promote
renewable energy investment. According to ProNicaragua, Law 532, For the Promotion
of Electricity from Renewable Sources, takes a note from the neoliberal playbook by
creating an enabling environment for renewable energy development by removing the
value-added-tax for any equipment or related purchases to develop the national
transmission line; allowing tax-exempt carbon-bond sales; and exempting any natural
resource exploitation taxes for five years after the start of a project. As previously
mentioned, this law has been quite effective – Nicaragua has generated 1.5 billion dollars
in private investment for renewable energy projects, and recently agreed to extend the
benefits of the law for another five years.

The Clean Development Mechanism in Action
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In contrast to the oil refinery and pipeline promised (but not realized) by
Venezuela, Nicaragua boasts a number of renewable energy projects that have already
been implemented. The country has vast resources for hydroelectric generation, and this
makes the bulk of Nicaragua’s on-line renewable generation from hydropower. It also has
the largest potential for large-scale generation projects. As Nicaragua is highly volcanic,
it already has geothermal energy production. The Momotombo geothermal project was
commissioned in 1983, and is plagued with technical and management challenges to
operate at full capacity; still it is the lowest cost electricity producer in Nicaragua (Porras
and Bjornsson 2010). The second project is a registered CDM project called the San
Jacinto Tizate geothermal plant, developed by US based Polaris Energy/RAM Power.
Nicaragua also has vast and unexploited wind energy potential. As of 2010, Nicaragua
boasts another CDM project and the largest operational wind energy facility, Amayo
Wind Park, in Central America (Arctas 2010).

Nicaragua is taking full advantage of benefits from the Clean Development
Mechanism and related emissions reduction mechanisms. Almost all countries in Central
America are participating in the Carbon Market (with the exception of Belize), and have
invested a great deal of time and effort in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
over the years (Hoyt 2011). Per Hoyt’s research for USAID, the country with the most
success in terms of number of registered projects is Honduras, followed by Guatemala. In
third place are Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador with six registered projects each.
Belize does not have any registered projects or projects in validation. The country with
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the highest rate of issuance (defined as the volume of Certified Emissions Reductions
(CERs) issued in aggregate for the country’s portfolio as a percentage of the country’s
total volume of CERs expected through 2012) is Nicaragua (13%), followed by El
Salvador (12%).

“The rather disappointing results of participation in the CDM—low levels
of registration and issuance of CERs (less than 15% on average) —have led some
governments in the region to question whether market mechanisms are indeed the
way forward to curb emissions. Specifically, El Salvador and Nicaragua, which
aligned with Venezuela and Bolivia (the ALBA countries) in international
negotiations, advocate for the creation of an adaptation fund (financed by
developed countries) that can then be administered by governments to combat
climate change. While they offer criticisms of market mechanisms, they are not
opposed to participating in the CDM as a source of revenue for projects. In
general, despite the appearance of an ideological divide within the region on the
importance of mitigation activities, all governments in Central America recognize
that mitigation and adaptation go hand in hand; the real issue for them comes
down to what vehicles and instruments to put into practice for mitigation and
adaptation strategies” (Hoyt 2011).
The adaptation fund financed by developed countries that ALBA is advocating for sounds
ironically compatible with Jeffrey Sachs’ neoliberal mandate for developed countries to
literally give money to help the “bottom billion” out of poverty.

In an effort to further distance itself from the United States, and to take a strong
stance against carbon emissions produced by developed countries, Nicaragua garnered
media attention as one of two countries (along with Syria) to refuse to sign the Paris
Agreement for climate change in 2015. Nicaragua refused on the grounds that the
agreement failed to go far enough to curb emissions, and that developed countries should
be held more accountable for their carbon contributions. However, to capitalize on the
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international opinion surrounding President Trump’s decision to pull out of the Paris
Agreement in 2017, Nicaragua gained more positive press coverage when it finally
signed on to the agreement as a response to Trump’s actions.

Energy’s End Use

While it is clear that the energy demands exceed supply in Nicaragua; particularly
in the case of industry, urban areas, and tourism development, it is not clear that rural
electrification projects are always utilized as fully as expected. As Nicaragua struggles to
shake its ownership of the lowest rates of rural electrification in Central America, it is
important to consider the true benefits of rural electrification initiatives. David Pearce
and Michael Webb posit that rural electrification projects are often prioritized because of
the perception that it promotes substantial non-quantifiable benefits such as poverty
reduction, political stability, reduced urban migration, and rural industry stimulus.
However, they argue that traditional rate-of-return analysis should play a larger role in
rural electrification expenditures (Pearce and Webb 1987). Similar case studies find that
many rural residents would rather see better schools or safer water sources prioritized
over electrification projects (Taylor 2005). Many recipients of rural electrification are
impoverished and can’t afford electricity payments, much less appliances and other
devices that use electricity. Again, this issue aligns with Jeffrey Sachs assertion that the
lowest six billion can’t even access next rung in the development ladder because they
don’t have resources to put a foot on the ladder or plug into the electric grid.
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Privatization Efforts

Nicaragua has long suffered from frequent power outages and a poor regulatory
environment for electricity. Nicaragua agreed to privatize its electric utility as a structural
adjustment in order to be admitted into the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt
relief act from the World Bank, with the intent of improving service and access to
electricity. As part of the privatization effort, the Nicaraguan Electricity Company was
broken into several components and sold to private companies. A Spanish company
called Union Fenosa was (controversially) the only bidder for the distribution company
(Cupples 2011). After the takeover, Union Fenosa installed electricity meters to many
homes, which effectively doubled what people had previously been paying for electricity.
Union Fenosa also added various taxes and surcharges, many of which were illegal. This
resulted in protests and vast resentment of the privatization effort. In fact, many people
stopped paying bills altogether, or wired their electricity around the meter, directly to the
source.

After privatization, service was not more reliable either and blackouts remain
common, as much of Nicaragua’s energy infrastructure is sub-standard and poorly
maintained. Because the private operators did not fairly price electric service they were
not able to invest in improved infrastructure. Also, Nicaragua’s political system has
traditionally favored more socialized institutions, so the population is used to having the
government provide basic services rather than a private supplier. Still, electricity rates
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continue to climb. Tim Rogers of The Nicaragua Dispatch reported a 7.78% rate increase
in April 2013 but a $35 million subsidy provided by ALBA-CARUNA, a Sandinista
cooperative that manages Venezuelan aid, kept the increase from being closer to 15%.
Still, Ortega has been actively courting private investors in renewable energy sources for
the duration of his most recent presidency.

Energy Policy Paradoxes

All of these initiatives seem well and good, but the motivations for this renewable
energy push remain cloudy. What is really driving Nicaragua’s energy investments? The
current situation holds a number of paradoxes. In a matter of years, Nicaragua hopes to
go from having the lowest regional rates of electrification to the highest; from the highest
rates of foreign oil import dependency to the highest rates of renewable energy
generation. Energy policy rhetoric emphasizes clean energy and rural electrification, but
does little to address Nicaragua’s dependence on wood fuel as a primary energy source.
Foreign investors and donor agencies continue to revoke funding in light of the
increasingly authoritarian Ortega administration; yet the Nicaraguan government
continues to pass regulatory legislation to promote international investment in its energy
sector. Furthermore, Nicaragua touts clean energy development with its goal of having
over 90% of its electricity generation come from renewables at the same time the Ortega
administration relied heavily on economic ties with Venezuelan oil subsidies. In spite of
these strong ALBA ties, the Ortega administration also granted concessions to two
different US oil companies to explore for oil and gas in Nicaragua’s Caribbean waters. In
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2009, Infinity Energy Resources signed a contract to invest $30 million exploring 5,000
square miles 40 miles off of Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast. If Infinity found oil, it could
produce for 30 years. This agreement was met with great resistance from the indigenous
Mosquito councils, who control the autonomous territories on the Caribbean coast. They
challenged the agreements in court, citing concerns that they had not been properly
consulted in the agreements, and that the exploration might harm the valuable fishing and
tourism industries on which they rely (Castro 2009).

Political Economy’s Perspective

In spite of these contradictions, Nicaragua’s lack of energy infrastructure and
reliance on foreign oil imports are clear motivators for energy sector development, as are
a number of other factors. Since Chavez died, ALBA shows no sign of weakening, but
Nicaragua is wise to diversify its energy supply. Nicaragua has good financial motivation
to capitalize on its geographic location and geologic features to participate in incentives
from the Clean Development Mechanism. Further, as the country is integrated into the
SIEPAC transmission line, it has incentive to produce energy to trade regionally. The
country has also recently reformed much of its energy regulatory structure to provide
favorable conditions to investors.

Realists would argue that Nicaragua is smaller and weaker than either of the
dueling hegemons, the US and Venezuela, so it is easy for them to capitalize (literally) on
Nicaragua’s need for energy. Laurent Cohen-Tanugi observes that since globalization is
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the economic paradigm du jour for international economic relations, countries adopt the
language of integration into the international system for two reasons.
“This integration first of all corresponds to their enlightened self interest in terms
of power; but the commitment to accept integration also allows them to gain time
and distract the West’s attention from the build up of economic and/or military
power over which the ‘international community’ will soon have no control.”
(Cohen-Tanugi 2007).
Here, Cohen-Tanugi presents the realist view that states rationally act in their own selfinterests as they integrate into the international economic system. Venezuela may tout
ALBA as an alternative to integration into the global market, but Nicaragua is still an
active participant in the global and regional market.

Indeed, Jilberto and Mommen (1998) describe regionalization as a recent
phenomena fostered by foreign direct investment and economic cooperation between
countries closely linked by geographical proximity or common interests. Regional
arrangements are the “direct result of government actions instituting regional trade
regimes and creating deeper integration of separate economies on the regional level”
(Jilberto and Mommen 1998). Interestingly, Nicaragua continues to participate in
CAFTA-DR while simultaneously remaining a very active member (both ideologically
and financially) of ALBA. Realists could argue that Nicaragua’s continued cooperation
with the US makes it less likely that the US will attempt to intervene in the Sandinista
party’s dominance, like it has in the past. Venezuela formed ALBA as an alternative to
globalization and US hegemony in the region. In spite of bellicose rhetoric, Nicaragua is
acting in its own self-interests from a realist perspective, and embracing both sides.
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Aside from subsidized oil, one of the most important reasons for Nicaragua’s
allegiance with ALBA is ideology. ALBA is effectively an organized economic interest
that dictates collective interests for its member nations. As Mancur Olson states in The
Logic of Collective Action (1965), “In an organization, an emotional or ideological
element is often involved” in determining collective interests. Peter Gourevitch agrees
with Olson, maintaining that ideology is an important factor in determining the collective
interests of organized economic interests, as are mechanisms of representation and
associated interest groups; systems of rules; and the state’s placement in the international
system of political-military rivals (Gourevitch 1986). However, Gourevitch goes further
and provides an explanation for how policy crises, such as Nicaraguan’s dissatisfaction
over rampant poverty in spite of the neoliberal policies embraced by Bolaños and his USbacked predecessors, can result in changing coalitions.
“In the prosperous years preceding the crisis, a policy approach and support
coalition developed. Then came the crisis, challenging both policy and coalition.
Crisis opened the system of relationships, making politics and policy more fluid.
Finally, a resolution was reached, closing the system for a time, until the next
crisis” (Gourevitch 1986).
Ortega’s victory and the revolutionary Sandanista party’s return to power is Nicaragua’s
solution to the policy crisis associated with neoliberal development (Tater 2009).
Nicaragua is part of a coalition supporting Venezuela and ALBA, and therefore
articulating a new vision for development.

Neoliberalism’s open-market foundation has been the prevailing international
development model in recent decades and Nicaragua has been seriously shaped by this
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grand development experiment. Beginning with the Chicago school in the mid 20th
century, the neoliberal model maintains that capitalism and globalization are essential for
growth in both developed and developing economies. Jeffery Sachs (2010) uses a ladderclimbing analogy to explain his neoliberal perspective on development. He purports a
rather top-down approach where if the poorest sixth of the world’s population could get
just one foot on the bottom rung of the development ladder, they could then begin the
slow climb from abject poverty – and it’s the developed world’s responsibility who
should lift them up so they might climb. Indeed, many Nicaraguans would not be able to
fully utilize electrification efforts because they are too impoverished to purchase anything
to plug into the grid. Ironically, as Hoyt points out above, ALBA would prefer to start its
own version of the CDM, funded by developed countries, rather than participate in the
global market. In this case, ALBA also wants developed countries to support their rise
from poverty, but within the constraints of its own market as opposed to the global
carbon market.

The failure of the neoliberal model to lift Nicaragua out of poverty was a main
motivator in Ortega’s 2006 election, and Nicaragua’s alliance with ALBA. With the
model Sachs describes, Nicaragua’s “haves” – those with some economic means – were
able to more easily climb the ladder and capitalize on the opportunities provided by
neoliberal economic development incentives, while the “have-nots” were left without.
This is especially pronounced because of the rampant corruption in Nicaragua, where a
very few powerful families control the majority of the country’s wealth, leaving a huge
proportion of impoverished people (Bull and Aguilar Stoen 2014). A vocal critic of the
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neoliberal model, Joseph Stiglitz would agree that Nicaragua is an excellent case study of
how the promise of globalization has not reduced poverty and served to drive inequality –
thus sending Nicaragua in search of the ALBA alternative. Arguably, ALBA is not so
much an alternative to neoliberalism, but a counterpoint to US hegemony. ALBA
provides Nicaragua with the huge ALBANISA “development” fund, promises massive
infrastructure, inexpensive oil, electricity rate subsidies, and a favorable trade market.
Venezuela is open to many market principles, such as selling oil directly to China
through Nicaragua, and developing a regional free trade agreement and carbon market.
Nicaragua has opted to take full advantage of the financial incentives provided by foreign
direct investments and international financial institution incentives for renewable energy
development while also enjoying the financial and ideological allegiance from Venezuela
and its oil wealth. Ultimately, Nicaragua’s energy development initiatives are
simultaneously guided by neoliberal principles from the US and international financial
institutions in harmony with ALBA’s version of a “regionally globalized” market.
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CHAPTER 5 – NICARAGUA’S “GRAND” CANAL: CUENTO CHINO? RHETORIC
AND FIELD-BASED EVIDENCE ON THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA

As Venezuela’s financial support was waning in Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega’s
Sandinista administration granted an open-ended concession to the Chinese company
Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Co. Ltd (HKND) to build the
long-dreamed of “grand canal” across Nicaragua (Figure 1). The Sandinistas, who first
came to power in 1979 on a tide socialism and anti-capitalist discourse and action, are
now fostering a system of government that promotes many of the tenets they ostensibly
fought against in the 1979 revolution, such as imperialism, social injustice, and
environmental degradation. This about-turn in rhetoric and action is highlighted by
Nicaragua’s partnership with a Chinese enterprise on the canal project in 2013. Though
HKND is privately owned by a previously unknown telecommunications tycoon named
Wang Jing, the $50-$80 billion dollar megaproject is speculated to have backing from the
Chinese government, and is clearly part of China’s “Going Out” strategy to encourage
state and privately held enterprises to invest in overseas markets (Daley 2016, Gransow
2015). There has been a significant amount of protest and criticism surrounding the
political, social, and environmental impacts of the canal. Complaints have been voiced
through a social movement protesting: the unjust compensation for land and human
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displacement, harsh criticisms of the inadequate environmental impact assessment of the
canal route, and the egregious violations of the Nicaraguan constitution embodied in the
publication of Law 840 (the Canal Law).

Though the concessions were signed in 2013, few obvious signs of progress
towards construction of the canal exist today. However, persistent fieldwork over the past
4 years reveals subtle actions taken by HKND and the Nicaraguan government to begin
construction of the Canal and/or associated projects like free trade zones. This paper
explores the discourses and actions surrounding the plan to build a canal across
Nicaragua, with particular interest in the ways the Ortega administration and HKND’s
Wang Jing frame the project, in contrast to the various criticisms it has received. The
analysis of discourse in favor of the canal is contextualized by a history of Nicaragua’s
anti-imperialist rhetoric aimed at the United States. The United States has a long and
much-criticized history of political, economic, and military intervention in Nicaragua,
including numerous attempts to build an interoceanic canal. Now China is attempting to
create a “maritime silk road” bifurcating the entire country and effectively controlling
large swaths of Nicaragua’s sovereign territory through the generous canal concession
and allotments granted in Law 840. A Chinese-controlled canal through Nicaragua would
also be a major geopolitical coup for Chinese interests, as it gains easy access to a trade
route to South America, Europe, and western Africa.
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Figure 4: Map of the proposed canal route. Credit: Mary Lee Eggert

Volumes have been written on emerging China-Latin America relations (Meyers
and Wise, 2017; Ellis, 2014; Fornes and Butt Philip, 2012; Gallagher and Porzecanski,
2010). From these we know that bilateral trade between China and Latin America
increased exponentially, from $29 billion in 2003 to $270 billion in 2012; China aims to
spend $500 billion in trade and $250 billion in direct investment between 2015 and 2020;
and that Chinese companies have a physical presence across the region in sectors such as
oil, mining, manufacturing, construction, telecommunications, and banking (Ellis 2014;
Dollar, 2017). China’s “Going Out” strategy refers to foreign direct investment on the
part of Chinese companies, and economic interests, securing natural resources, and
acquiring new markets (Gransow 2015). Chinese enterprises are interested in importing
primary goods such as mineral, energy, and food resources from Latin America, as well
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as importing manufactured goods such as electronics and textiles to the region, and thus
are willing to invest in the necessary infrastructure to conduct business and transport
these goods between the regions.

China’s involvement in Latin America is of great interest to observers, not only
because of changing power structures related to the United States’ longstanding
hegemony in the region, but also because of China’s willingness to engage with states
which have been traditionally hostile to US interests. Wise and Meyers (2017) reject the
idea that China’s rise in Latin America has been “bellicose” in nature, and maintain that
“China’s intentions are developmental in nature……and not an affront to US sovereignty
in the Western Hemisphere.” Piccone (2016) agrees that China pursues “win-win policies
grounded on the basic premise that LAC (Latin America and the Caribean) states value
traditional definitions of sovereignty and noninterference as much as it does.”

We argue that China’s involvement in the construction of an interoceanic canal
across Nicaragua is a direct challenge to US hegemony in Latin America, and that
China’s rapid economic growth, need for raw materials, and maritime access between the
Pacific and Atlantic parallels the United States’ embrace of imperialism and hegemony at
the turn of the 20th century. Further, we reject the notion from the popular press that no
progress is being made towards the canal. We present evidence to the contrary and
ascertain that the Nicaraguan “Gran Canal” is imperialist in nature and an overt
geopolitical maneuver hallmarking China’s dominance in South-South relationships
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enabled by a mutual rejection of traditional liberal values such as human and
environmental rights.

Specifically, this article will address “economic geography – trade, politics, and
differing models of state-capital relations” and political geography and geopolitics via
“competing hegemonies within Latin America and the Caribbean” using the Nicaragua
canal as a case study. To do so, we first provide an overview of China’s rapid economic
growth and interest in overseas direct investment in infrastructure as a means of
diplomacy, in spite of accusations of imperialism and a failure to deliver promised
megaprojects. We then highlight the similarities between the United States’ efforts to
build a canal across Nicaragua during the height of its imperialist endeavors at the turn of
the 20th century and China’s current geopolitical ambitions with the Nicaragua canal. We
analyze the ways in which Nicaragua’s canal concession to China, via Law 840, violates
human and environmental rights, as well as the Nicaraguan constitution – in spite of
assurances to the contrary from both Chinese and Nicaraguan officials. We then explore
the actions of the “No al Canal” movement and the repressive reactions of the Nicaraguan
government as indications that the canal is progressing. We demonstrate further evidence
of progress towards building the canal from the field and highlight how although the
tenets of the original Sandinista movement included fighting US imperialism and
promoting human and environmental rights, the parameters of the Nicaragua canal
embrace Chinese imperialism and ignore the rights of Nicaraguans and their land.
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Megaproject Imperialism

China’s recent economic growth has allowed it to invest in infrastructure projects
around the world. Chinese infrastructure and megaproject investment is prevalent across
the global south, especially in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, thus ushering a
new era of South-South trade. With a population of over 1.3 billion and an exponentially
growing economy, China is unsurprisingly trying to access additional resources through
investments in extractive industries, industrial farmland, and energy sources.

China is broadly accused of “neo-imperialism” in Africa and other developing
regions to meet this end (Lumumba-Kasongo 2014). While China invests broadly in
markets that seem lucrative, it has found mutually beneficial ways to work with
“semipariah states that Western democracies remain wary of” – and these countries are
happy to engage, “since securing similar funds from Western powers normally entails
tiresome assurances on human rights and transparency — topics Beijing is only too
happy to disregard.” (Cheng 2013). The Chinese relationship with countries such as
Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Iran has received international media attention, primarily because
of the sensational nature of these relationships in the eyes of Western media outlets while
the Chinese regard these as standard business relationships, without concern for politics.
Many Latin American countries have welcomed China’s involvement in the region. This
is certainly the case with Brazil’s vast supply of commodities such as soy, and also the
“new left” countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua who have
vocally resisted American hegemony in the region. Wise and Meyers (2017) note that
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South American countries have experienced a commodity boom similar to that at the turn
of the 20th century while Central American countries do not have commodities to offset
the flood of Chinese manufactured goods into the region. This is mostly true from a
geographical standpoint, except in the case of Nicaragua, where China is not interested in
commodities; rather it seeks to build an interoceanic canal – the largest megaproject ever
attempted – to control access to trade in Latin America, Africa and Europe.

Megaproject development has become one of the most lucrative industries in the
world, and China invests more annually on infrastructure in developing countries than
any other nation. Flyvbjerg (2014) estimates that the total global megaproject spending is
6 to 9 trillion dollars per year. While governments welcome foreign direct investment as
a way to decrease poverty, development projects often displace local residents in ways
that do not enhance their economic well being. The capacity of local residents to adapt to
the socioeconomic and biophysical transformations depends on the livelihood alternatives
and strategies available to articulate with new economic processes (Li 2014). Since the
Chinese economy has opened, the Chinese investment in megaprojects across the world
is significant. In 2013, China’s president Xi Jinping announced the “One Belt, One Road”
plan to build infrastructure around the globe. To date, this initiative promises over $1
trillion in spending over 60 countries, and solidifies China’s economic and geopolitical
agenda (Perlez and Huang, 2017). China’s “railroad diplomacy” has become more
prominent over the last ten years as China has made rail deals on almost every continent,
and in countries deemed a political and economic risk by western investors.
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“China is moving so fast and thinking so big that it is willing to make short-term
missteps for what it calculates to be long-term gains. Even financially dubious
projects in corruption-ridden countries like Pakistan and Kenya make sense for
military and diplomatic reasons” (Perlez and Huang, 2017).
There is much speculation regarding China’s ability to complete such ambitious
projects, but “railroad diplomacy” has been successful in many places. For example, in
Kenya, a Chinese state-owned company (China Roads and Bridges Corporation)
completed a $3.8 billion standard gauge railway connecting the port city of Mombasa to
the capital, Nairobi; the first section of a promised railway connecting Kenya to Uganda,
and eventually stretching to Rwanda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia (Lefkowitz 2017). This
five-hour route provides a much-needed passenger and goods alternative route to the
dangerous road connecting the two cities over an eleven-hour journey. Remarkably, this
project was completed 18 months ahead of schedule; unsurprisingly, it was fraught with
disagreements regarding cost overruns, land acquisition, and environmental impact
(Lefkowitz 2017). These are common issues in megaprojects, regardless of who finances
them; the Chinese and their host country partners seem more willing to overlook these
constraints in the name of progress.

Indeed, Latin America is witnessing a rash of megaprojects that are promoted as
the panacea to underdevelopment ills. Primarily, these megaprojects facilitate trade in
primary goods from and manufactured goods to Latin America. These projects include
extractive operations, large-scale energy and biofuel projects and transportation
infrastructure (Gudynas 2009; Machado Aráoz 2009, Castro 2012). Fornes and Butt
Philip (2012) assert that China’s interest in Latin America goes beyond securing raw
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materials such as energy, mineral, and food resources (specifically oil, gas, lithium,
copper, coffee, palm oil, and soy). The Chinese are also looking for markets in which to
sell manufactured goods. To enable bilateral trade in the region, the necessary
infrastructure to allow goods to flow back and forth from Latin America must be in place,
and the Chinese are willing and able to invest in this.

Transportation infrastructure initiatives such as the South American Initiative for
the Integration of Infrastructure and the Plan Puebla-Panama create new enclaves that
connect sites of resource extraction to global markets (Castro 2012). However,
“development projects involve reorganizing the meaning and control of space” and thus
are inherently displacing (Vandergeest 2003, Taylor and Steinberg 2011). Particularly,
development via the construction of megaprojects sets forth a series of processes that
transform the socioeconomic and biogeophysical dynamics of landscapes and results in a
series of primary and secondary displacements that are lost within nationalistic ideologies
of progress and development (Gellert and Lynch 2003). This is undoubtedly the case as
the Nicaraguan canal route cuts the country in half, creating profound social, political,
economic, and environmental consequences on either side of the divide. Furthermore, in
rural areas of Latin American where most of these megaprojects are taking place,
livelihood options usually depend on access to land, as is the case for Nicaragua.
Purported job creation from the megaprojects rarely balances the losses from land
displacement.
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Before HKND announced the “Gran Canal Interoceanico” in 2013, the largest
megaproject in Latin America earmarked by the Chinese was a 220 kilometer dry canal
across northern Colombia to link the Atlantic and Pacific coasts to facilitate Chinese
exports from and imports to South America (Fornes and Butt Philip 2012). However,
China’s transportation megaprojects face major challenges in Latin America.
“But across the region, one large Chinese rail venture after another has come
crashing against the hard realities of Latin American politics, resistance from
environmental groups, and a growing wariness toward China. While China boasts
of its rail initiatives around the world, it has often been stymied in Latin America,
reflecting how even China’s formidable ambitions have limits. Now, new worries
over China’s economic growth are raising more doubts about the blitz of what
China calls its ‘railroad diplomacy,’ as parts of Latin America reel from their
dependence on China” (Barrow 2010, Romero 2015).
The fate of other China-backed transportation megaprojects projects notwithstanding, it is
worth investigating why China is so desperate for an extraordinarily expensive alternative
to the Panama Canal, particularly when claims that it has no geopolitical aspirations
abound. First, an examination of the development of the Panama Canal by the United
States, a nation with clear geopolitical ambitions at the turn of the 20th century, is
prudent.

The Elusive Nicaragua Canal

An inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua has been contemplated for centuries. The
United States has a long history of intervention in Nicaragua and has always been the
prime proponent of the canal. Indeed, William Lawrence Merry, Consul General of
Nicaragua explained in 1892,
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“The availability of the Nicaraguan Isthmus was urged in 1550 by Antonio
Galvao. Since 1822 the United States government has had its attention repeatedly
called to the advantages of the location for canalization, and in June 1826, the first
private contract was made for the excavation of the work, which failed, owing to
political and financial reasons.”
In the 1800s, the United States’ economy was growing rapidly and raw materials from
the western US were necessary for continued development of the population centers in
the east. Thus, the US needed a more efficient transportation route for necessary
commodities to fuel its development. The California gold rush made a canal across
Central America all the more urgent. As rail travel across the entirety of the United States
was not yet possible, the most efficient option to reach California from the east coast was
via boat to the eastern shore of Nicaragua or Panama, then overland, then back up the
western coast by boat. This occurred during the heyday of Manifest Destiny, and the
United States’ attempts to control the western hemisphere. During this time, United
States filibuster William Walker and millionaire Cornelius Vanderbilt were fighting for
control in Nicaragua (Dando-Collins, 2009).

The United States spent decades and millions of dollars trying to establish
whether to build a canal through Nicaragua or Panama. Which route to chose became a
very heated political drama. In 1892, Merry described the effort to pass Nicaragua canal
legislation as bipartisan and essential to protect the United States’ national interests,
threatening that Europe would take the route if the US didn’t, explaining
“if this patriotic legislation is not to be obtained from congress, the Canal will
nevertheless go on to a conclusion, probably ending under European control, to
the lasting shame of partisan politics and the serious detriment of the Republic,
politically and commercially…The volume of public opinion will force action, I
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trust, in time to prevent Europe, with its selfishness and land hunger, from
planting itself on the future highway of the world’s commerce in Nicaragua.”
This sentiment underlies the United States’ overriding concern that its power in the
region would be undermined. However, almost 40 years earlier, Peter Stout (1859)
adamantly defends the intention of the United States, emphasizing that it is “seeking no
exclusive advantages . . . but that the purpose (of the canal) is to open the routes across
the Isthmus to the commerce and travel of all nations.” Echoing Stout’s sentiments from
the 1800’s, in present day, the Chinese have maintained that the Nicaragua canal is also
for the use of all nations.

Ultimately, the United States decided to build a canal through Panama,
purchasing the rights to the canal for $40 million from France in 1902. The terms of the
concession gave the United States control over the canal for 100 years; and the US ceded
control back to Panama in 2000. Since then, major upgrades to the canal have been
completed to allow for increasingly large cargo ships to pass through; though concerns
remain that the Panama canal expansion wasn’t ambitious enough (Wade 2015). In 1914,
the United States and Nicaragua signed the Bryan-Chamorro treaty, which granted the
United States exclusive, perpetual rights to build an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua.
The United States paid Nicaragua $3 million for this, and also received a ninety-nine-year
lease of Great and Little Corn islands and the right to establish a naval base in the Gulf of
Fonseca. The US primarily saw this as a way to ensure that no other country could build a
canal in Nicaragua. The Central American Court found in favor or complaints by
neighboring countries; Costa Rica claiming that the canal adversely affected the San Juan
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River which it shares with Nicaragua; El Salvador claiming that the Gulf of Fonseca
belonged jointly to El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua and the Central American
Court found in favor of Nicaragua’s neighbors, but didn’t have standing to enforce the
ruling with the United States (Munro 2003). Nicaragua refused to accept the decision and
the Bryan-Chamorro treaty remained in force until 1970, as the Sandinistas were gaining
power with an anti-US imperialism platform.

Cuento Chino

Merry would likely be surprised to find out that China now has the rights to a
canal across Nicaragua. The United States has been conspicuously quiet regarding any
perceived threat to its hegemony via a Chinese built Nicaragua canal. With similar
intentions but less notoriety than Cornelius Vanderbilt in the mid 1800s, present-day
Chinese businessman Wang Jing and his Hong Kong Nicaragua Development (HKND)
corporation reached an agreement to build a canal across Nicaragua, which contains
concessions similar to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. In remarks at the groundbreaking
ceremony for the Grand Canal in December of 2014, Jing referred to the Grand Canal as
the “Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century” which “will definitely change the pattern of
global maritime trade.” Wang Jing is clearly aware of the history of the canal, the scale
of the project, and the global speculation against it ever being built. He states

“When we talk about the Grand Canal of Nicaragua, it always reminds us the
century-old dream shared by many people in history, which of course rest with the
thick blueprints and papers. Until today, this dream of over a hundred years has
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gone through the time channel echoing the roaring of trucks and heavy
machineries now in front of us. People cannot help wondering whether the dream
comes true in this century. If so, what we will get and what we will lose? How
that a dream wasn't realized for so many generations, will become a reality today?
In fact, during the last two years, we have encountered challenges in all aspects.
Being regarded as the largest infrastructure project of the human history is not
only simply meant to the huge amounts of excavations through the mountains,
constructions of roads and bridges overwater. In more than two years, the doubts
and speculations on the Canal Project about protection of the environment,
resettlement, technology, machinery, finance, law, politics, experience,
equipment, etc. never stopped. Today we proudly announce that we have
overcome all those challenges. With the full support of President of Nicaragua
and relevant government departments, and with the concerted efforts of worldclass companies and scientists from countries like the US, UK, Belgium, Australia
and China, and esp. with the overall understanding recognition and support of
Nicaraguans, we have made the milestone commencement with full confidence”
(HKND 2014).
Terms of Nicaraguan Canal Concession – Law 840

Indeed, Wang Jing received the full support of the President of Nicaragua, and
instead of a treaty between nations like the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, on June 13, 2013 the
Nicaraguan Assembly approved Law 840 “Ley Especial para el Desarollo de
Infrastructura y Transporte Nicaragüense atingente a El Canal, Zonas Libre de
Comercio e Infrastructuras Asociadas” (Special Law for the Development of
Nicaraguan Infrastructure and Transport related to The Canal, Duty Free Zones, and
Associated Infrastructure), which grants Wang Jing’s company (HKND) permission to
build the canal across Nicaragua. The proposed canal would be the world’s largest
infrastructure project of the 20th and 21st centuries (Figure 1). The 278 km-long
Nicaragua Canal will cut Nicaragua in half and displace at least 120,000 Nicaraguans
from their land (Figure 2). A few days later, the government published the accords for a
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framework of the concession and implementation with respect to the Nicaraguan Canal
and Development Projects (Acuerdo Marco Concesión e Implementación con relación a
El Canal de Nicaragua y Proyectos de Desarrollo). According to Law 840, Nicaragua
will have a the right to participate in the economic gains made by the canal and its sub
projects begining at the level of 1% and increasing by 1% each year until reaching 99%
in 100 years.

This means “that the canal will do no more than pass through Nicaragua, but it is
not owned by Nicaragua and Nicaraguans. For many more years to come it will be the
private property of large capital” (López Baltodano 2013). Others agree: Acclaimed
writer, poet, and former FSLN activist Gioconda Belli (2017) states
“As in the eighties, the Ortega apparatus and their well-tuned propaganda
machine will appeal to the Nicaraguan people’s true and historic anti-imperialism,
using it like a machete to cut down and vilify anyone opposed to sovereignty: not
the sovereignty of the country – in any case, that’s already been sold to Wang Jing
– but that of the pseudo-monarchy that rules us.”
The amount of sub-projects and sub-companies under the project have lead many
to speculate that the project is being designed as an instrument to launder money (Aburto
2017). The canal is only one part many other infrastructure projects – per law 840,
including two ports, an oil pipeline, railway line, two free trade zones, an airport, large
tourism zones, and any other infrastructure the investor deems is necessary for more subprojects (Amnesty International, 2017). Furthermore, Wang Jing may sell the concession
to anyone, without the input of the Nicaraguan government. Economist Enrique Saenz
explains,
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“All of the national territory is committed, not only the route along the Canal.
Not only can Wang Jing negotiate the rights ceded to him in any way, but also he
can do it with anyone, without the government having any power to oppose it.
There’s even a provision that if the financiers come to operate in Nicaragua
they’re not obligated to register or report themselves to the Superintendence of
Banks” (Aburto 2017).
However, at the groundbreaking ceremony for the Canal, Chairman Wang himself made
assurances that the canal project will be fair and equitable:
“I’d like to express that Chinese companies and Chinese have arrived at this
beautiful country to build it and not to destroy or damage it. We vow to respect all
the rights and interests of the Nicaraguan people. The resettlement work will be
based on the principles of being equitable, fair, public and transparent. Without
the consent of the owners, or the satisfaction with the compensation, not a single
plant on their land will be touched” (HKND 2014).
Unsurprisingly, Chairman Wang’s statements have rung hollow with Nicaraguans
in the canal’s path, as well as international observers. The environmental impact
statement for the canal route, though prepared by a third party international consulting
firm, has been roundly criticized for being inadequate and not meeting international
standards (Hurete-Perez, et. al., 2016). In 2017,
“Amnesty International has noted that, despite national regulations and
international human rights standards, Law 840 was approved in a way that has
been described by various national actors as irregular, extremely fast, opaque and
lacking real and genuine consultation. The state’s actions constitute an
unacceptable failure to respect its international human rights obligations.”
(Amnesty International 2017).
Contrary to Wang’s words, owners are not satisfied with compensation, and their lands
have been surveyed without their consent – under the watchful eyes of military police and
Chinese surveyors.
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“No al Canal” movement: the “Movimiento Campesino”

Fornes and Butt Philips (2012) state
“China’s official rhetoric revolves around the core message that China is one
developing country that is now in a position to help others without being
encumbered by the historical baggage of colonialism. Problems may arise if and
when the resources that China is seeking to exploit from part of an environment
that populations in Latin America wish to preserve.”
This is clearly the case with the Nicaragua canal, as exemplified through the “No al
Canal” movement (Movimiento Campesino), which has worked tirelessly, using legal and
peaceful means, to bring about the repeal of Law 840 and the canal concession. The “No
al Canal” movement has taken its case against the canal to the Interamerican Commission
on Human Rights and the Latin American Tribunal for Water, and presented a petition
with 28,000 signatures to Nicaragua’s National Assembly to repeal Law 840. In addition
to these legal moves before national and international bodies, the “No al Canal”
Movement has organized 93 peaceful marches protesting the canal and Law 840 (as of
September 2017). Despite this enormous effort and support of international bodies like
the Latin American Tribunal for Water, which declared that the Nicaraguan government
should cease any activity on the canal and related projects, progress towards the
construction of the canal continues, as does repression of the “No al Canal” Movement
by the Nicaraguan government.
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Si al Canal, No a la libertad

The Nicaraguan government makes few official comments with respect to the
progress on the canal or the No al Canal movement. They do however, sponsor
concurrent marches in support of the canal in the same place that anti-canal protests are
taking place. Moreover, the Nicaraguan National Police routinely block participants
from reaching the protest locations. When the police block Nicaragua’s highways, they
give no explanation to the detained protestors – they simply prevent them from
proceeding (e.g. Chamorro and Moncada 2017). They do so in the face of national
media, who record the blockades where protests occur on the spot, rather than the original
destinations. Police even go so far as to place physical deterrents such as nails or wires
across the road to prevent protestors from passing. Use of force by the police is not
uncommon and has led to four protestors being injured in the course of the protests – one
protestor was blinded and another lost an arm to police inflicted injuries.

This type of intimidation by the Ortega regime is not uncommon (e.g., Burbach
2009). Mónica Baltodano, Sr., who was active in the Sandinista revolution states that
“the right to assembly has been systematically violated during the past year as
opposition demonstrations are put down by goon squads and that the Ortega is
establishing an authoritarian regime, sectarian, corrupt, and repressive, to
maintain his grip on power, betraying the legacy of the Sandinista Revolution”
(Burbach 2009).
The current intimidation and repression of the No al Canal movement is nothing new, nor
is it deterring protests against the canal.
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Sigue al canal?

Protests against the canal continue despite consistent reporting by the
international media that construction progress on the canal is slow or nonexistent (e.g.,
Daley 2016), clear activity is being made towards construction of the canal. This activity
is not in the form of huge earth moving equipment and camps housing tens of thousands
of Chinese and Nicaraguan workers, but in the form of geophysical studies, social and
environmental impact assessments, and surveying of all boundaries of private land along
the route. This activity is taking place at a slower pace than that promised when the plans
to build the canal were first announced. This is in part because of the objections made by
the No al Canal movement, which questioned the outcomes of the social and
environmental impact assessment studies, forcing HKND to conduct further feasibility
studies and, in some cases, alter the course of the canal. Evidence of progress on
construction of the canal also comes from HKND’s own newsletters (e.g., HKND 2017),
the websites of companies contracted by HKND (e.g., CSA Global, ERM, and Rodio
Swiss Boring), trade magazines like Dredging Today (Dredging Today 2016), and
boosterism reporting in government aligned newspapers like La Voz del Sandinismo.

Other evidence of activity comes from non-aligned news sources, such as the
reporting in all national newspapers of the crash of the CSA Global aircraft flying
LIDAR (light detecting radar used to perform sub-centimeter mapping of topography
along the route of the canal) in October of 2015. Local residents near the crash site
confirmed this type of activity. On the ground research by the authors as early as
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December 2013 showed that the Chinese engineers were already on the ground. For
example, a group of Chinese surveyors in orange overalls and hard hats came to the small
Pacific village of Gigante looking for accommodation. Moreover, fieldwork at the
proposed site of the Pacific deep-water port near the outlet of the Brito River revealed
that Rodio Swiss Boring was conducting test drilling of sediments to determine the best
location for the deep-water port. In fieldwork in June of 2016, access was at first denied
to the site by private security agents, but was granted after explaining the right to public
access to the beach. Upon receiving access to the beach, Rodio Swiss Boring was
identified at work, protected by agents from the Nicaraguan Police. After similar
obstacles in March of 2017, access to the site was again granted and a large group of
Nicaraguan Police accompanying some surveyors was observed. A local resident
explained that this was to be “el lugar de unas oficinas – para los Chinos” (a place for
some offices – for the Chinese). In June of 2017, employees of IMPRESUB, an
international underwater engineering company contracted by HKND confirm that they
are working on canal-related construction in Nicaragua. Interviews with lawyers and
officials from the government land titling office in the Rivas region in the western portion
of the canal reveal that there is a freeze on transfer of land titles in the 10 km-wide canal
zone.

Conclusion

All of these actions point to the fact that Nicaragua is confidently preparing for a
Chinese-built canal. Progress may appear slow to international observers but actions on
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the ground indicate that the canal is indeed moving forward. China’s spotty record of
completing promised megaprojects and rumors of Wang Jing’s vastly decreased fortune
make speculation even more rampant, yet people in the canal’s path are witnessing
enough action on the ground to continue to protest the adverse political, social and
environmental impacts of the canal in spite of repression by the Nicaraguan government.
Opponents of the canal are well aware of the Ortega administration’s hypocritical stance,
vocally denouncing the United States’ long history of intervention in the country while
embracing China’s offer to bifurcate the country, without regard for human or
environmental rights, in the name of economic development. Skepticism remains about
China’s ability to actually complete such an ambitious megaproject. Should China
actually complete this canal, it will have access to its “maritime silk road” and a true
channel to natural resources and new markets for manufactured goods, solidifying the
power of South-South economic relationships, and overshadowing the United States as a
global hegemon. Human and environmental rights are Western constructs of little value
to an economic empire that has pledged over $1 trillion dollars in much-needed
infrastructure investment in the global South.
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CHAPTER 6 – QUÉ DIRÍA CARLOS? THE ‘NO AL CANAL’ MOVEMENT AND
THE RHETORIC OF RESISTANCE TO NICARAGUA’S GRAND CANAL

Figure 5: Canal protestors carry a sign that claims ‘Ortega sold our homeland.’ Photo credit: Esteban Felix/
AP

“The Canal is the second Revolution” – Daniel Ortega
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The idea of an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua has been a source of conflict
for almost two centuries. In the 1800s, the United States spent decades and millions of
dollars trying to establish the best route for a canal through Nicaragua, ultimately
deciding to build the canal in Panama. The impetus for a trans oceanic canal through
Central America was entirely self-serving for the United States’ interest in establishing a
more convenient trade route between the east and west coasts as the country grew
westward, as well as easier access to California during the gold rush. Then, as now,
private business interest intertwined with national interests, and led the initiative to build
a canal across Nicaragua. In 1849, business tycoon Cornelius Vanderbilt’s Accessory
Transit Company was granted a twelve-year exclusive concession to finance and build a
canal across Nicaragua. Civil war in Nicaragua and subsequent invasion by US filibuster
William Walker ultimately derailed Vanderbilt’s plans for a canal, though he did
successfully operate a dry land crossing for several years in the mid-1800s. The US
maintained rights to a canal in Nicaragua through 1970, when resentment towards US
intervention and the corrupt Somoza regime was boiling into a full revolution. The
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) declared victory over the Somoza
dictatorship in 1979, on a platform of human rights, and a rejection of foreign
interference in Nicaragua. After losing power from 1990 to 2007, the FSLN returned to
power with Daniel Ortega as president until the time of writing.

In 2013, the Ortega administration granted Chinese business magnate Wang
Jing’s Hong Kong Nicaragua Development Corporation (HKND) a generous 100-year
concession to build an interoceanic canal “and associated projects” in Nicaragua. While
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the Ortega administration maintains that the canal project will create jobs and improve
the lives of people in the second poorest country in the western hemisphere, there has
been widespread concern that the canal concession violates the constitution as well as
human and environmental rights (Amnesty International 2017, Huete-Perez, et al 2016).
Many former members of the FSLN and revolutionary leaders, along with members of
the rural population (campesinos) who stand to lose the most from the construction of the
canal, have organized a large-scale civil resistance to the canal.

This research examines the origins of, and impetus for the ‘No al Canal’
movement. It analyses how the canal concession, law 840, goes against the revolutionary
constitution and imposes significant human and environmental rights violations. It also
examines the important role played by women in the movement. In particular, it looks at
the role played by Francisca Ramírez and Mónica López Baltodano, the two main leaders
of the ‘No al Canal’ movement and employs a feminist perspective to explore how they
have leveraged their unique identities as a campesina and an elite lawyer, respectively, to
garner support for the movement. It also examines ways in which the ‘No al Canal’
movement employs the language of the original founders of the FSLN, Augusto Sandino
and Carlos Fonseca, as a kind of rhetorical trap to reinforce how far the Ortega
administration has deviated from the original FSLN philosophy. Finally, this research
explores how the ‘No al Canal’ movement has maintained nonviolent discipline, even in
light of violent repression tactics employed on the protestors by the Ortega
administration.
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Foreign intervention and government oppression

Nicaragua is no stranger to resistance to oppression. The Nicaraguan Revolution,
pitting the FSLN against the Somoza dictatorship, is one of the most violent, and also
romanticized, in Latin American history. The impetus for the revolution was not only the
corruption of the Somoza dictatorship, but also the United States continued intervention
in Nicaraguan affairs, and unwavering support for the Somoza regime. Following Cuba’s
violent revolution, the leaders of the FSLN urged supporters to take up arms against
Somoza. Their impassioned pleas for armed struggle held Marxist values and did not see
value in civil resistance after so many years of oppression. The leaders of the FSLN spent
years preparing, and then fought a violent, bloody civil war, ultimately overthrowing the
Somoza dictatorship.

The US responded by funding an equally violent counter-

insurgency, known as the Contras, in a misguided attempt to stop the spread of socialism
close to home.

Indeed, the United States has a long history of intervention in Nicaragua. Carlos
Fonseca founded the FSLN to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship and resist US
intervention. Daniel Ortega’s version of the FSLN is in power today, though in a very
different form than Fonseca’s FSLN. To help rationalize the need for his new
revolutionary party in the 1960s, Fonseca identified a number of events constituting US
intervention in Nicaragua in an article first published in 1969 titled “Nicaragua: Zero
Hour.” Fonseca detailed a long list of grievances, including that the US and England
signed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 to build an interoceanic canal across the
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country; in 1854 a US warship bombed the town of San Juan del Norte out of existence;
in 1855, William Walker invaded Nicaragua and declared himself president; in 1909, the
US sent the “Knox Note” claiming its right to intervene in Nicaraguan affairs; in 1912
US marines occupied Nicaragua after the US intervened on behalf of the conservative
government; in 1914, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty gave the US eternal rights to build a
canal across Nicaragua; in 1933, the US installed and supported a National Guard to
suppress the popular uprising led by Augusto Sandino; in 1934, the National Guard,
headed by Anastasio Somoza and backed by the US, assassinated Sandino (Fonseca
1969). If Carlos Fonseca had not been murdered by the Somoza regime in 1976, he
would likely have added the United States’ support of the Contra war after the FSLN
overthrew Somoza and took power in 1979, to his long list of damaging interventionist
actions by the United States.

An ephemeral canal with a long history

To Fonseca and other revolutionary leaders, the United States’ long-standing
interest in building a transoceanic canal represented an overt desire to quite literally
control territory and economy in Nicaragua. In the 1800s, the United States’ economy
was growing rapidly and raw materials from the western US were necessary for
continued development of the population centers in the east. Thus, the US needed a more
efficient transportation route for necessary commodities to fuel its development. The
California gold rush made a canal across Central America all the more urgent. Since a rail
line across the United States was not yet complete, the most efficient option to reach
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California from the east coast was via boat to the eastern shore of Nicaragua or Panama,
then overland, then back up the western coast by boat. The United States spent decades
and millions of dollars trying to establish whether to build a canal through Nicaragua or
Panama.

Ultimately, the United States decided to build a canal through Panama,
purchasing the rights to the canal for $40 million from France in 1902. The terms of the
concession gave the United States control over the canal for 100 years; and the US ceded
control back to Panama in 2000. In 1914, the United States and Nicaragua signed the
Bryan-Chamorro treaty, which granted the United States exclusive, perpetual rights to
build an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua. The United States paid Nicaragua $3
million for this, and also received a 99-year lease of Great and Little Corn islands and the
right to establish a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca. The US primarily saw this as a way
to ensure that no other country could build a canal in Nicaragua. The Bryan-Chamorro
treaty remained in force until 1970, as the Sandinistas were gaining power with an antiUS imperialism platform.

Carlos Fonseca was rightly wary of US involvement in Nicaragua, viewing most
actions as exploitative of Nicaragua for the sole benefit of the US. Fonseca stated:
The exploitation of minerals such as gold and copper, which is directly in the
hands of foreign investors, pays ridiculously small sums to the national treasury
through taxes. Parallel to this, the handing over of the national riches to the
Yankee monopolies has continued to increase. In 1967, for example, a law went
into effect that gave Magnavox, a company specializing in the exploitation of
forests, absolute ownership of a million hectares of national territory (Fonseca
1969).
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Were he still alive, Fonseca would likely be surprised that the FSLN under Daniel Ortega
granted the newest global superpower a sweeping concession to a canal across Nicaragua.
Like the United States in the 1800s, China is currently looking for a trade route it can
control to support its expanding geopolitical power, and to command better access to raw
materials and export manufactured goods to Latin America and beyond.

Law 840: the Nicaraguan canal concession

On June 13, 2013 the Nicaraguan Assembly granted a Chinese company, Hong
Kong Nicaragua Development Corporation (HKND), headed by CEO Wang Jing,
permission to build a canal across Nicaragua. The National Assembly approved Law 840
“Ley Especial para el Desarrollo de Infrastructura y Transporte Nicaragüense atingente
a El Canal, Zonas Libre de Comercio e Infrastructuras Asociadas” (Special Law for the
Development of Nicaraguan Infrastructure and Transport related to The Canal, Duty Free
Zones, and Associated Infrastructure), in an “extremely fast” and “opaque” process
(Amnesty International 2017). The proposed canal would be the largest infrastructure
project in history. The 278 km-long Nicaragua Canal will cut Nicaragua in half and
displace at least 120,000 Nicaraguans from their land (see Map 3.1). The government
also published the accords for a framework of the concession and implementation with
respect to the Nicaraguan Canal and Development Projects (Acuerdo Marco Concesión e
Implementación con relación a El Canal de Nicaragua y Proyectos de Desarrollo).
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Amnesty International and other international observers roundly criticized the canal
concession’s flagrant violation of rights:
Nicaragua has pushed ahead with the approval and design of a mega-project that
puts the human rights of hundreds of thousands of people at risk, without
consultation and in a process shrouded in silence. Amnesty International has
noted that, despite national regulations and international human rights standards,
Law 840 was approved in a way that has been described by various national
actors as irregular, extremely fast, opaque and lacking real and genuine
consultation. The state’s actions constitute an unacceptable failure to respect its
international human rights obligations (Amnesty International 2017).
Law 840 stipulates that Nicaragua will receive one percent of the economic gains made
by the canal and its sub projects the first year, increasing by one percent each year until
ownership reaches 99% in 100 years. As stated by movement leader Mónica López
Baltodano (2013), this basically means “that the canal will do no more than pass through
Nicaragua, but it is not owned by Nicaragua and Nicaraguans. For many more years to
come it will be the private property of large capital”.

Law 840 violates the Nicaraguan constitution in numerous ways, and even to the
casual observer, the canal concession is viewed as an overt land grab on behalf of the
Ortega regime.
“The canal is ‘a personal family project about President Ortega maintaining
power through a megaproject that's generating illusions of profits among the
people,’ said Manuel Ortega Hegg, a sociology professor at the Central American
University in the capital, who is not related to the president” (Gallano and
Wessenstein 2013).
Indeed, there are numerous cases where the concession omits protections relating to free,
informed, and prior consent guarantees contained in the Nicaraguan constitution, national
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legislation and Convention 169 of the ILO on indigenous and tribal peoples (FIDH 2015).
For many, the crux of the issue remains in Ortega’s impressive business tactics.

John Lee Anderson’s 2014 reporting for an extensive New Yorker article on the
proposed canal revealed a variety of opinions from former FSLN revolutionaries,
academics, and politicians. For instance, Ortega’s former Ambassador to the US, Arturo
Cruz, stated:
The strength of this regime lies in the country’s poverty […] Ortega is the last
caudillo standing. He is a father figure for the campesinos—he can resolve their
needs. He has been clever about knowing how to distribute the scarcities with
more abundance than other politicians […] It can be resolved for many people
with a few pieces of roofing tin and a handful of nails. The voter thinks, Now I
won’t get wet. And when it rains he thinks of Ortega” (Cruz cited in Anderson
2014).
Likewise, former revolutionary leader Dora María Téllez stated:
The Chinese must be throwing themselves a party right now […] Since the
concession doesn’t specify geographical limits, it effectively gives them the
whole country to do what they want. What do they have to pay in taxes? Nothing.
What control does Nicaragua have? None. [The Chinese] will have the
commercial interest and absolute control […] The only reason Daniel Ortega
would have signed the canal concession is if he is the real owner of the project.
Because stupid he is not (Téllez cited in Anderson 2014).
In the same vein, Francisca Ramírez says the canal concession “is a new form of slavery.
We will become the slaves of a foreigner” (Cerda 2016). Based on his rhetoric and
ideology in the 1960s and 1970s, Carlos Fonseca would likely have felt the same way.

Anderson (2014) captured the idea that Ortega was wary of losing an important
financial ally when Hugo Chávez died in an interview with Antonio Lacayo, a prominent
businessman and a former senior government official. Lacayo stated:
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Daniel can see the disaster that is coming in Venezuela […] So he looks around.
It’s not a long list: there’s Russia, China, Iran. With Iran, there was nothing to get.
From Russia, he got some buses and some reconnaissance planes. So Daniel
decides to attract China to Nicaragua—to ‘defend’ it from the US, and to
contribute economically. How does he do it? By offering the Chinese a hundredyear concession to do whatever they want (Lacayo cited in Anderson 2014).
According to Lacayo, Ortega might not personally like the Chinese for being ‘too
capitalistic,’ “the point is, Daniel needs a friend” (Lacayo cited in Anderson 2014). This
is why, as contradictory as it might seem, the government has used anti-imperialistic
rhetoric to justify Chinese investment in the canal, “as it represents a counterweight to
US power” (Soutar 2017).

It is important to note that in spite of the ample media coverage of the canal
opposition, the canal project (and Daniel Ortega himself) enjoys widespread support from
much of the Nicaraguan population, both elites and campesinos. Even proponents of the
canal evoke revolutionary imagery in their rhetoric. Rural people are hopeful that the
canal and associated projects will, indeed, bring jobs and prosperity to Nicaragua.
According to congressman Edwin Castro, “[t]his is a project that’s been waiting for
centuries and that’s why we’re interested in doing it as soon as possible […] There’s no
unconstitutionality. It’s political attacks from those who don’t want Nicaragua to move
forward” (Castro cited in Gallano and Wessenstein 2013). Similarly, in the interview with
Anderson (2014), Manuel Coronel Kautz, the president of the Nicaraguan Canal
Commission, said “Wang Jing impressed us as a young revolutionary who could take
control of this kind of project. He made an excellent impression on both the President and
myself. He is young and clean”. Eden Pastora, Daniel Ortega’s ally-turned-foe-turned	
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ally, was placed in charge of dredging for the canal along the San Juan river as his
official role in the current Ortega administration. In an interview with Anderson (2014),
he boasted:
There will be two-hundred-ton trucks doing earthmoving and specialized drivers
earning a thousand dollars a day! The ticos [Costa Ricans] are just concerned that
we’re going to be the richest people in Central America […]. There are going to
be railroads, refineries, satellites, hydroelectric plants, airports, and over thirtyseven social projects—all of it achieved in an atmosphere of freedom and
democracy, without even so much as a tear-gas cannister fired, without
persecuting anybody. In five years, Managua will be a canal city, the most
beautiful of Central America […]. Viva Daniel Ortega!
‘No al Canal’ movement

While many have supported the project, a vocal movement of civil resistance to
the canal has emerged to protest human and environmental rights abuses and what many
view as the selling of Nicaragua’s sovereignty to a Chinese company. Soon after Law
840 was passed and the canal concession was announced, Mónica López Baltodano,
daughter of a prominent revolutionary and women’s movement leader Mónica Baltodano,
emerged as a leader of the anti-canal movement by presenting her objection to Law 840
in the form of a book “Recurso por Inconstitucionalidad: 25 Verdades Sobre La
Concesion del Canal Interoceánico de Nicaragua” (López Baltodano 2013). This book
was presented to the Nicaraguan Supreme Court and the Nicaraguan population in
general, and is freely available online. López Baltodano (2013) shows in detail and in
spirit how Law 840 contradicts the Nicaraguan Constitution, which was promulgated
under President Daniel Ortega in 1987 during his first term in office. In the larger sense
López Baltodano (2013) argues that as a Nicaraguan citizen who is committed to the
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construction of a new society that “eliminates all class of exploitation and achieves
economic, political and social equality for all Nicaraguans, as well as absolute respect for
human rights” (as established in the preamble to the Nicaraguan constitution), it is her
historic obligation to bring to light how the specific terms of Law 840 contradict the
constitution.

López Baltodano submitted evidence that the concession violates the constitution
to the Supreme Court and received no response. She then informed the territories of
Nicaragua that would be impacted by the canal about the legal implications and
unconstitutionality of Law 840. Community members such as Francisca Ramírez had
already begun to organize protests after the first time Chinese representatives of HKND,
accompanied by the Nicaraguan Police and the Nicaragua Army, began to survey
properties within the canal zone (a zone 10 km wide along the length of the canal). Police
and army accompanied the Chinese land surveyors to ensure that the work could be
completed – effectively forcing land and homeowners to permit entry to the surveyors.

Francisca Ramírez was born in a small community in Nueva Guinea and has been
a farmer her whole life. She explained how the nonviolent resistance movement that she
leads emerged:
We started talking amongst a small group of us and then we started to organize
ourselves. We started to take to the streets to protest because they do not respect
our rights, they do not consult us. The only thing they tell us is that we are going
to be evicted (Ramírez cited in Salomon 2017).
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At first the protests were spontaneous and not centrally organized. Later, beginning in
September of 2014, the local community leaders and Baltodano decided to formalize
their efforts to coordinate protests. They created the Consejo Nacional en Defensa de
Nuestra Tierra, Lago y Soberanía (National Council for the Defense of Land, Lake and
Sovereignty) as the legal body for the ‘No al Canal’ movement, with an overt mission to
repeal Law 840 and the canal concession.

The ‘No al Canal’ movement has combined civil resistance with legal
proceedings to achieve its objectives. Importantly, under the leadership of López
Baltodano, it has taken appeals to repeal Law 840 to the Interamerican Commission on
Human Rights and the Latin American Tribunal for Water. In April 2016 they presented
a citizen’s initiative Law to repeal Law 840, signed and supported by more than 28,000
citizens, to Nicaragua’s National Assembly (López Baltodano 2017). Baltodano and
collaborators published another book documenting the legal battle against the canal, all
the marches against the canal, and all the pertinent legal information to provide a
comprehensive overview of the struggle against the canal. This book, titled La Entrega
de un País: Expediente Jurídico de la concesión canalera en Nicaragua (Handing over a
country: Legal implications of the Nicaragua Canal concession), was released to
commemorate four years of struggle since the canal concession was approved (López
Boltodano 2017).

Nonetheless, slow progress towards the construction of the canal continues
despite this enormous effort and support of international bodies like Amnesty
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International and the Latin American Tribunal for Water. As recently as December 2017,
Chinese surveyors were observed measuring properties for offices and related
infrastructure. The Nicaraguan government has said nothing to indicate a deviation in
plans for the canal’s construction. Regardless of whether canal construction ultimately
proceeds, Law 840 and all of the related concessions to the Chinese remain in place until
the Nicaraguan government abolishes the law. The canal protesters have maintained that
this is a violation of their sovereign rights as autonomous citizens of Nicaragua. As
further evidence of the canal’s continued threat to the rights of Nicaraguans, the ‘No al
Canal’ movement has continued to protest and has organized 91 peaceful marches against
the canal and Law 840 as of October 2017 (Soutar 2017).

Violent Repression

While the Nicaraguan government has made few official comments with respect
to the progress on the canal or the ‘No al Canal’ Movement, it has sponsored concurrent
marches in support of the canal in the same place that anti-canal protests have taken
place. Moreover, the Nicaraguan National Police has actively blocked participants in ‘No
al Canal’ campaigns from reaching the protest locations. When the police has blocked
free access of circulation on Nicaragua’s highways, they have given no explanation to the
detained protestors – they have simply prevented them from proceeding (e.g. Chamorro
and Moncada 2017). They have done so in the face of national media who record the
blockages. When these blockades occur, the leaders of the campesino anti-canal
movement have called for detained protestors to conduct their protests on the spot, rather
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than try and reach the original destinations (López Baltodano 2017). The police have
used other tactics to stop the protests, including spreading “miguelitos” in the roadways
to damage the tires of trucks carrying protestors (miguelitos are a Spanish word for
caltrops, or bent nails that are strewn in the road to puncture vehicle tires). Some
protestors have begun to refer to the “miguelitos” as “danielitos,” in reference to Daniel
Ortega’s regime of oppression. The police have also detained the vehicles of ‘No al
Canal’ movement leader Francisca Ramírez and physical action by unknown persons has
also been taken against her family members. For example, barbed wire was strung across
the road where her son was travelling, injuring him as he was thrown from his motorcycle
in April 2017. Her daughter was the victim of an attempted kidnapping in 2016 (Silva
2017). Use of force by the police is not uncommon and has led to four protestors being
injured in the course of the protests – one protestor was blinded and another lost an arm
to police inflicted injuries. Some fear that the situation in Nicaragua could reach the
violent repression and execution of environmental and social activists as seen in
Honduras with the case of the murder of Berta Cáceres (see Maher in this volume).

The international community has roundly denounced the government’s repression
of the anti-canal protests. The European Union Parliament issued a joint motion for a
resolution on the situation of human rights and democracy in Nicaragua, denouncing that
the megaproject “could displace thousands of small farmers and indigenous people in the
areas surrounding the canal project” and “the use of tear gas and rubber and lead bullets
by police against protestors” (European Parliament 2017). They also specifically
addressed the case of Francisca Ramírez. The resolution urged “the government to refrain
	
  

133

from harassing and using acts of reprisal against Francisca Ramírez and other human
rights defenders for carrying out their legitimate work”, emphasized “the right of
environmental and human rights defenders to express their protest without retaliation”,
and called “on Nicaragua to effectively launch an independent environmental impact
assessment before engaging in further steps and to make the whole process public”
(European Parliament 2017).

The role of women in the ‘No al Canal’ movement

Women have long been involved in Nicaragua’s fight against outside
intervention, and the Nicaraguan women’s movement has been well documented
(Kampwirth 2004, Isbester 2001, and Barad de Volo 2001). The FSLN published a
manifesto for women’s rights in 1969, as part of the momentum built from their overall
social justice platform. The Sandinistas even had an official women’s organization, the
Organization of Nicaraguan Women “Luisa Amanda Espinoza” (AMNLAE) which
advocated for women’s interests (Isbester 2001). Women took a central leadership role in
the FSLN, both in combat and later in government administration. Isbester (2001)
explains that the women’s movement was able to redefine itself through each new
government administration’s perception of the role of women in society, while still
maintaining some degree of continuity. While the overall 1979 revolution was extremely
violent, the larger women’s movement has maintained the three essential components of
a successful social movement: an autonomous identity, use of resources appropriate to
the group’s goal, and a focused conflict (Isbester 2001). The ‘No al Canal’ movement,
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led by women such as Francisco Ramírez and Mónica López Baltodano, has championed
these crucial elements of a successful social movement.

Women unmistakably lead the current resistance to the proposed canal, even in
spite of risks to their personal and familial wellbeing. According to Amnesty
International (2016), “[w]omen human rights defenders are often at risk of violence and
experience intersecting forms of discrimination.” When examining the leaders of the ‘No
al Canal’ movement and their motivations, it is important to note that the distinction
between Mónica López Baltodano and Francisca Ramírez goes beyond their
socioeconomic status and education to their politics, or lack thereof. In almost every
press interview or official statement, Ramírez is careful to state that the ‘No al Canal’
movement is not political; rather it is fighting for the singular cause of stopping the
human and environmental rights violations of the proposed interoceanic canal. For
example, she stated:
Our movement is a popular, autonomous campesino movement for people from
different origins, for the defense of the earth, the lake and our sovereignty. We are
open to everyone with no limitations, but our movement has nothing to do with
party politics […]. [The canal is] not a national project. If it were, they’d be
saying: ‘Tell us what you think’, ‘Let’s look deeply into this’, ‘What does it
involve?’ But what’s really happening is that if someone is against the canal – or
they just think that they’re against it – then they assume that they’re against him
(Daniel Ortega’s government) and they turn it into a political issue (Ramírez cited
in Cerda 2016).
Ramírez explained her motivations for leading the resistance to the canal, citing rhetoric
that evokes Carlos Fonseca: “I thought about all the suffering we had to go through in the
struggle for our rights against the transnational companies and powerful economic groups
that always try to run ragged over the rights of the poor and those of limited resources in
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the country” (Ramírez cited in Cerda 2016). Ramírez was speaking to a newspaper
reporter from Confidencial, a widely read, anti-Ortega, news outlet in Nicaragua, and in
many ways, Ramírez’s quotation applies Kaplan’s (2017) concept of rhetorical traps.
Confidencial readers are likely perceptive of the similarities between this rhetoric and
that of the FSLN founders. They also likely recognize the differences between these
sentiments and those of the current Ortega administration. She explained that it felt as
though the government wasn’t taking their lives into account as they failed to consider
the opinion of local people who would be directly impacted by the canal’s path (Salomon
2017). Carlos Fonseca would likely agree with her.

Campesinos, who stand to lose the most from the construction of the canal, have
participated in protests in vast numbers. Francisca Ramírez, the de facto leader of the
campesino anti-canal movement is herself a campesino. Her background makes her easily
approachable and relatable to other campesinos. This also makes her a darling of the
media and evokes comparisons to Berta Cáceres (see Maher in this volume). Ramírez’s
tireless leadership and willingness to talk to the press give the ‘No al Canal’ movement
much needed visibility, and a charismatic leader; yet her campesina status also leaves her
more vulnerable to threats and attack unlike Mónica López Baltodano. The European
Parliament has included multiple sections aimed at protecting Ramírez in its resolution
condemning the Nicaraguan government’s response to the canal protests, denouncing acts
of repression and aggressions in Nueva Guinea, the intimidation and arbitrary detention
of Francisca Ramírez, as well as violent attacks against her relatives (European
Parliament 2017).
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While Francisca Ramírez has mainly drawn on a discourse of protection of
campesinos’ rights in the face of potential land deprivation and loss of livelihood, Mónica
López Baltodano has used a Sandinista discourse to reveal the regime’s contradictory
stance. In so doing, she has actively employed what Kaplan (2017) describes as rhetorical
traps as a civil resistance strategy. Mónica López Baltodano is one of the many who see
the current conflict over a Chinese corporation’s intent to build a canal across Nicaragua
as yet another example of Daniel Ortega’s diversion from the original tenets of the FSLN.
The elite and former FSLN revolutionary leaders who have since broken with the current
iteration of the party have been the most vocal about Ortega’s perceived corruption, and
describe the canal and associated legal concession as a thinly veiled land-grab and money
laundering operation. In an interview with Alejandra González (2017) for La Prensa, she
pronounced that she considered herself a Sandinista in the historic vein of Augusto
Sandino and Carlos Fonseca and a critic of Daniel Ortega’s current iteration of
Danielismo, rather than Sandinismo. López Baltodano is a daughter of two Sandinista
revolutionaries, and she acknowledges that their example has left her with her sense of
commitment to Nicaragua and Nicaraguan society. Specifically, she says that the work
that she did with her mother, Mónica Baltodano, on the four-volume Memorias de la
Lucha Sandinista gave her much inspiration and insights into the struggle for equality
that she now sees eroding (González 2017). Together, Francisca Ramírez and Mónica
López Baltodano have thus used their unique identities and perspectives to bring together
a visible and vocal civil resistance movement to stop the interoceanic canal from being
built, even in light of the regime’s violent repression.
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Qué diría Carlos?

As Matilde Zimmerman (2000) recounts, Carlos Fonseca “was better known to
the ordinary citizen than any of the people who made up the new revolutionary
government.” In her treatise on Fonseca, she reveals how the struggle of Carlos was
long: “he fought for nearly twenty years as the central ideological and strategic leader of
the revolutionary movement in Nicaragua” (Zimmerman 2000). Mónica López Baltodano
has realized that it will take years of organizing with the citizens of Nicaragua to build a
strong base from which to overturn Law 840 and the threat to lives of hundreds of
thousands of rural campesinos. She stated that the book published in 2017, Handing over
a country: Legal implications of the Nicaragua Canal concession “is a compilation of 4
years of legal and political work that we have done side by side with the campesino
movement to repeal the canal law” (López Baltodano cited in Vásquez 2017). In so
doing, López Baltodano has followed Fonseca’s lead in her commitment to a prolonged
struggle with ordinary citizens (campesinos) versus a rapid victory. Similarly, the text
and ideas in López Baltodano’s 2013 Recurso por Inconstitucionalidad are reminiscent
of the founders of the FSLN including passages such as “just as shown in our historic
past, that if we want a Nicaragua in peace, with social justice, freedom and happiness,
those who have power must submit to the demands of the Nicaraguan populace” (López
Baltodano 2013). This type of sentiment harks to the action and words of both Sandino
and Fonseca (see Zimmerman 2000).
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The introduction of this same publication employs the power of the Revolutionary
constitution of 1987 to prove how Law 840 is unconstitutional (López Baltodano 2013).
The Nicaraguan constitution of 1987 was formed at a time when the Sandinista party was
still “pure” and had not been perverted to the Danielismo of today. It was in the mid
1980s that the revolutionary government had just begun to write Carlos Fonseca out of
history, or at least make less mention of his contributions to the foundation of the party
(Zimmerman 2000). López Baltodano (2013) quotes the 1987 constitution to say that
“given that the principal function of the state […] is to improve the lives of the
people and to carry out an equal distribution of wealth, the new megaproject of
the canal does not present the citizens of the country with the conditions to
overcome economic, political, and social inequality that is pervasive in
Nicaragua.”
She goes on to state that Law 840 and the canal concession only strengthen the
conventional extractivist economy that benefits the interests of the private company to
whom the canal concession was given. This type of argument, relying on the constitution
of a government not far from the ideals of Fonseca, brings the founders of the revolution
to the forefront and reminds the Nicaraguan populace of their recent fight against a
different form of dictatorship – that of Somoza. As López Baltodano (2013) stated,
“Sandino showed us that the sovereignty of a nation is not to be debated, it is to be
defended.”

In López Baltodano’s interactions with the Nicaraguan press we see many
instances where she invokes the founders of the Sandinista party. For example, she told
González (2017) that she admired Sandino and Fonseca because they committed
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themselves with action to social causes – that they went beyond ideas and moved to
action to change Nicaragua. And she stated, like Fonseca believed, that she is convinced
of the importance of organizations that have their roots in the popular sectors, not in the
high seats of the political parties. This recognition of the grassroots and identification
with the populace is reminiscent of Carlos Fonseca. The people of Nicaragua aptly
describe Fonseca’s position to Matilde Zimmerman (2000) when they repeatedly told her
“Carlos – he was one of us. He spoke our language. He would never have let his happen
to our revolution”. Indeed, qué diría Carlos? What would Carlos say?

Conclusion

Carlos Fonseca was assassinated before he could voice his own opinion about the
’Gran Canal’, but from his words and opinions documented as he founded the FSLN, it is
safe to surmise that he would not be pleased with Daniel Ortega’s legal framework to
concede a large amount of Nicaraguan territory to a Chinese corporation to build such a
canal. Francisca Ramírez has been extremely careful not to voice any sort of political
affiliation or opinion except to say that the government does not seem to actually care
about the rights of rural people who live in the path of the canal. Her status as a woman, a
campesina, and leader of the ‘No al Canal’ movement has made her more vulnerable to
violent retaliation from the Ortega regime, but her charismatic leadership has allowed her
press coverage and provides a compelling voice to the ‘No al Canal’ movement. The EU
Parliament issued a resolution demanding Francisca Ramírez’s protection because of the
government’s violent actions towards her. This resolution also denounced the human and
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environmental rights violations of Law 840. As a member of the elite class, and daughter
of prominent FSLN revolutionaries, lawyer Mónica López Baltodano has not been
subjected to physical violence or repression for her leadership against the canal. She has
used her status and education to her advantage to be able to provide the ‘No al Canal’
movement a wider audience, and has evoked assistance from the international community
to help repeal the canal concession.

Francisca Ramírez and Mónica López Baltodano have employed a variety of
strategies of civil resistance to protest the human and environmental rights violations of
Law 840 including demonstrations, petitions and rhetorical traps in media interviews. At
the same time, they have used legal channels, appealing to international judicial bodies.
Utilizing both strategies of civil resistance and judiciary means to protest Law 840 have
reinforced each other and elevated the international attention to the issue. The language
they have used evokes that of the FSLN founders, and highlights the ways in which the
Ortega administration has deviated from the original tenets of the FSLN, effectively
employing rhetorical traps to highlight this disparity. This study expands upon the
existing literature on civil resistance, illustrating how a proposed infrastructure project
can have legal, social, and environmental ramifications that warrant a civil protest of the
project. Chenoweth et al (2017) highlight cases in which violent repression is used to
counter civil resistance campaigns with maximalist goals, using case studies that are
more overtly political protests. Here, we highlight how rhetorical traps and legal
maneuvers can be added to the toolkit of more traditional civil resistance methods such as
protest to garner support for a specific cause – in this case the repeal of a law which
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grants developers the right to commit human and civil rights violations in the name of the
world’s largest infrastructure project. Regardless of whether the canal is built, at the time
of writing, Law 840 remained in place. The leaders of the ‘No al Canal’ movement
continued to work tirelessly in their civil resistance to a law defended with violence and
repression. Carlos Fonseca and Augusto Sandino would surely support their efforts.
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

Figure 6: ‘Trees of Life’ installed with Venezuelan funding by Vice President Rosario Murillo were
symbolically destroyed in the April 2018 protests against the Ortega administration. Inti Ocón/AFP/Getty
Images

This dissertation addressed four key research questions surrounding the political
economy of Sandinismo 2.0. First, Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega has enabled
national development through economic imperialism via the United States, Venezuela,
and China while espousing a strong anti-imperialist rhetoric in a variety of ways. Ortega
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maintained important neoliberal economic mechanisms such as CAFTA-DR and
embraced IFI financing using Venezuelan financial support as collateral for loans.
Funding from Venezuelan oil proceeds through ALBANISA allowed Ortega to cultivate
a strong base of support through overt support to the poor via roofing materials, access to
health care, and other direct assistance. This financing came with an amplification of
Ortega’s socialist messaging through ALBA and the rhetoric of Hugo Chavez, and also
allowed Ortega to re-write the constitution to abolish term limits. As he retains power
through elections condemned by the international community as irregular and nontransparent, comparisons to the old Somoza regime his Sandinista party (version 1.0)
worked so hard to overthrow become more obvious. Maintaining access to neoliberal
financing mechanisms has succeeded in keeping the economy afloat; allegiances with
non-western powers have allowed Ortega’s power to coalesce in to a dynasty with his
wife currently serving as vice president. Bold allegiances with Venezuela and China are
widely supported by Ortega’s base, as long as the regime is able to placate them through
financially support of basic social programs.

Nicaragua promoted renewable energy development funded by neoliberal
development initiatives while simultaneously embracing Venezuelan fossil fuels and
socialist ideology to achieve the goals of increasing Nicaragua’s seriously lagging
electrification rates, and to be able to sell any surplus electricity on the regional market.
Accepting neoliberal financing and popular press from the west for an aggressive
renewable energy initiative made Ortega’s infrastructure development seem progressive
and has been an apt and effective mode of providing Nicaragua energy security and
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improved development metrics. Accepting Venezuelan oil subsidies and thermal power
plants also improved electrification rates, allowing Nicaragua to better meet immediate
demand and development metrics with the bonus of an ideological allegiance that
amplified Ortega’s socialist rhetoric and desire to disavow US hegemony.

Nicaragua granted the Chinese a massive legal concession to territorial and legal
rights for an interoceanic canal after centuries of criticism towards the United States’
efforts to build a similar canal as part of Ortega’s populist promise to bring jobs,
infrastructure, and prosperity to Nicaragua. As Venezuelan support waned, Ortega was
glad to find another geopolitical partner to help with Nicaragua’s financial woes and to
serve as a counterpoint to US hegemony in Nicaragua. The constitutional, human, and
environmental rights violations inherent in the canal concession did not go unnoticed by a
substantial portion of the population, and speculation abounds as to what degree the canal
concession ultimately serves as a land-grabbing tool for Ortega and his allies.

The human and environmental rights violations of the canal concession and
associated law highlight the divergence between the ideals of the original Sandinista
revolutionaries and the current Sandinista administration in a variety of ways. The 1979
revolution was fought on the premise of equality, human and environmental rights,
transparent government, anti-foreign intervention on Nicaraguan sovereign affairs, and a
commendation of the Somoza regime’s dictatorship in Nicaragua. That the Ortega
administration granted a Chinese corporation a sweeping concession to an interoceanic
canal and associated projects, effectively ceding financial and territorial control to a large
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portion of Nicaraguan territory was cause for alarm to many citizens. Human and
environmental rights violations evident in the canal concession caused massive protests;
and No al Canal movement organizers utilized the language and values of the original
FSLN to highlight their cause. The Ortega regime’s violent repression of these protests
further illustrates the ways in which the current government disregards the values it
touted during the revolution.

One of the most challenging aspects of this research has been that Nicaragua is
indeed a fast moving target. Five days before this dissertation was to be submitted, the
country erupted into civil unrest. What started as small-scale protests surrounding cuts to
social security benefits morphed into large and violent protests demanding Daniel
Ortega’s resignation. At the time of writing, thirty-seven people have been killed in the
uprising, including a reporter shot dead on live television. Ortega has ordered all but one
television station off the air, severely limiting the press’ ability to monitor the situation.

For many years after his return to power, Ortega’s ability to maintain neoliberal
economic policies while promoting socialist rhetoric and social programs garnered a
strong base of support among Nicaragua’s poor without closing the door to financial
support from international institutions. This allowed Nicaragua to steadily grow its
economy in a politically and socially stable environment, but failed to improve its status
as the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (CIA 2018). Financial support
from Venezuela allowed Ortega to fund social programs and rewrite the constitution to
ensure his continued reelection. As Venezuelan financial support began to wane, Ortega
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granted a sweeping concession for an interoceanic canal to a Chinese corporation,
spurring international criticisms and civil resistance to the human and environmental
rights violations in the canal law. The canal protests have served to magnify the growing
dissatisfaction that many Nicaraguans have regarding the Ortega administration’s
increasingly totalitarian leanings, prompting comparisons to the Somoza dictatorship that
ended in a bloody revolution.

Nicaragua’s political economy highlights the United States’ shifting global power.
Tired of endless intervention from the United States, Nicaragua went looking for
alternate financial and ideological allies, and found them in Venezuela and China. These
countries were able to offer Nicaragua options for economic growth and political stability
in return for an opportunity to increase their own global power, right in the United States’
backyard. While Venezuela has descended into an economic and social disaster, its
ideological leadership through ALBA remains. China continues to expand its global
economic dominance, and regardless of whether the canal is ever built, the concession to
a large piece of Nicaraguan sovereign territory remains as a direct challenge to US
hegemony. In spite of his best attempts to maintain power through unlikely allies and
populist rhetoric, Ortega’s immediate future is in question. The United States might
benefit from taking an introspective look at Nicaragua’s rhetoric versus reality.
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